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DON’T CRY FOR ME ARGENTINA:  
ECONOMIC CRISES AND THE RESTRUCTURING  
OF FINANCIAL PROPERTY 
Horacio Spector* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Property rights are a prerequisite for economic growth.  Indeed, 
economists and legal scholars stress the ability of property rights to 
solve collective action problems, such as the tragedy of the commons 
and the tragedy of the anti-commons.1  More direct contributions have 
also been noted.  For instance, it has been argued that formal land own-
ership plays a central role in economic development, and that formal 
property titles are correlated with an increase in social well-being.2  
* Dean of the Law School and Professor of courses in Law and Economics and Legal 
Theory at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. The author is grateful to Eduardo Levy 
Yeyati, who read the whole Article and made helpful comments. The author also 
benefited from conversations with Pablo Guerchunoff, Pablo Guidotti, and Ilya Somin, 
and also thanks Camila Romero and the staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law for their painstaking checking of all the citations herein. 
 1. This literature really started in the Scottish Enlightenment.  See DAVID HUME, 
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. III, pt. II, § II (Dolphin Books ed. 1961) (1740).  
Among contemporary works, see, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989), Stephen R. Munzer, The Commons and the Anticommons in 
the Law and Theory of Property, in 10 THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson ed., 2005), David 
Schmidtz, The Institution of Property, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: WHAT REALLY 
MATTERS, WHAT REALLY WORKS (D. Schmidtz & E. Willott eds., 2002), Harold 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967), Robert 
C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, (1993), Garrett Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of 
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
621 (1998), and Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
 2. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS 
IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).  For an excellent “natural 
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When assessing the economic functions of property, it is generally 
assumed that financial property rights are as beneficial for economic 
growth as are property rights over tangible assets.3  The public policy 
recipe in this situation would be to respect property claims over financial 
assets to the greatest possible extent.  However, perfect compliance with 
financial property raises special problems.  While natural catastrophes 
(such as floods, earthquakes, or tsunamis) can damage land holdings and 
real estate, the working of a market economy by itself cannot annul or 
reshape real property.  By contrast, financial property is subject to the 
vagaries of economic and political markets.  In fact, the respect for fi-
nancial property can become impossible in the event of a microeconom-
ic (insolvency, bankruptcy, etc.) or macroeconomic crisis (bank run, 
stock market crash, financial fallout, etc.). 
This Article will discuss five paradigms that can be used in order to 
restructure financial property under economic crises, particularly those 
affecting emerging market economies:  the emergency paradigm, the 
monetary paradigm, the valorist paradigm, the social justice paradigm, 
and the bankruptcy paradigm.  Both the emergency and monetary 
paradigms have been heavily influenced by decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.4  The valorist paradigm is of German origin,5 and the 
social justice paradigm can be regarded as an application of the doctrine 
that private property has a social function, espoused by socialist and 
Catholic social thought.6  The last paradigm, the bankruptcy paradigm, 
is a theoretical construct that has never been used. 
experiment” study that shows that land titling develops individualist and materialist 
beliefs, see Rafael Di Tella et al., The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the 
Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters, 122 Q. J. ECON. 209 (2007). 
 3. See Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244 (acknowledging flaws in theories that pre-
suppose that individuals, when allowed to make their own decisions based on their 
property rights without government interference, will reach decisions that are optimal 
for society). 
 4. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN, CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987). 
 5. BERND RÜTHERS, DIE UNBEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG. ZUM WANDEL DER 
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNG IM NATIONALSOZIALISMUS (1997). 
 6. Leon Duguit, Les Transformations Générales Du Droit Privé Depuis de Code 
Napoléon, in THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 129-
36 (Alejandro Alvarez ed., 1969).  For the Catholic Church’s doctrine about the social 
function of private property, see the following encyclicals:  Pius XI, Quadragesimo 
Anno (1931), John XXIII, Mater et Magistra (1961), Paul VI, Populorum Progressio 
(1967), and John Paul II, Centesimus Annus (1991). 
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The Article will expose the inadequacies of the first four paradigms, 
both in light of doctrinal analysis and political economy.  Finally, it will 
argue that the bankruptcy paradigm coheres with rule of law principles 
and minimizes costs in terms of long-term economic growth.  More 
specifically, it will claim that the bankruptcy paradigm can maintain a 
separation of powers, reduce rent-seeking by small interest groups, and 
mitigate the overall damage to the financial system caused by a crisis.  
This paradigm is especially helpful to respond to bank runs in countries 
that have a currency board or formal dollarization. 
Two methodological features are worth emphasizing.  First, the 
kind of financial crisis on which the Article will focus takes place in 
countries where financial liabilities are mostly denominated by foreign 
currencies.  The crisis starts with a bank run provoked by a drastic with-
drawal of foreign and domestic capital, among other relevant factors.  
The bank run creates severe illiquidity in the banking system which, if 
not rapidly treated, will cause overall insolvency.  Furthermore, there is 
no lender of last resort or other possible safeguards that could contain 
the fallout.  Insurance deposit schemes or international financial assis-
tance are either unavailable or insufficient.  Though the analysis here 
will focus on this kind of crisis, many of its conclusions are also relevant 
for financial crises under other currency regimes. 
Second, the Article will discuss decisions by the Argentine 
Supreme Court in 1986, 1990, and 2002 through 2006, and by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the 1920s and 1930s.  In Argentina, litigation as a 
result of the mega-crisis of 2001 was massive.7  By April 2002, the 
Attorney General confirmed that 210,188 injunctions [amparos] were 
filed in federal courts against the suspension of cash payments 
[corralito] and the freezing and pesification of deposits [corralón].8  In 
addition, provincial courts throughout the country ordered injunctions in 
 7. Catalina Smulovitz, Judicialization of Protest in Argentina, The Case of 
Corralito, in ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW:  SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE NEW 
LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES 55 (Enrique Peruzzotti & Catalina Smulovitz eds., 
2006).  Post-crisis litigation in Argentina was however of a much smaller scale than 
litigation in Germany after the hyperinflation of 1918-1923, which soared to several 
millions of cases.  For an account of German litigation, see ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, 
MONEY IN THE LAW–NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE 
BORDERLINE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 206-11 (1950). 
 8. Pesification is the compulsory conversion of U.S. dollar-denominated bank 
deposits into Argentine pesos at an official exchange rate. 
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audita parte9 that compelled banks to return deposited sums in U.S. 
dollars to plaintiffs, without adjudicating the substantive question of 
law.10  Some provincial courts were accused of unethical behavior.11  
Bank depositors also organized a widespread social and political mobil-
ization that included banging pots and pans, assaults on banks, and pop-
ular assemblies. 
While Argentina provides a fascinating case study, the problem 
addressed in this Article has arisen in other emerging market economies, 
as well.  Similar situations have arisen in Mexico (1994-1995), Korea 
and Indonesia (1997), Russia (1998), Ecuador (1998-2000), and 
Uruguay (2002), resulting in financial debacles that led to bank runs, 
defaults, massive devaluations, and political instability.12  Though a 
bank run is difficult to conceive today in developed countries that have 
easy access to domestic and international capital markets, bank runs 
may, in principle, occur in even the most developed economies.  Recall 
the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s, which led the Ohio state 
government in March 1985 to declare a bank holiday to prevent a run on 
Home State Savings Bank.13  To this extent, the conclusions reached in 
this Article might also provide a point of reference for discussing 
responses to financial crises in the developed world. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Article will discuss the paradigms involving the reshaping of 
property rights against the background of the United States and 
Argentine Constitutions.  Both Constitutions contain similar relevant 
clauses.  First, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution provides that no persons shall be “deprived of . . . life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”14  The Fifth Amend-
 9. These injunctions were ordered without hearing the banks’ defenses. 
 10. Héctor Mairal, Argentina:  El derecho en tiempos de cólera, 3 ACTUALIDAD 
JURÍDICA 3, 20 (2002). 
 11. Horacio M. Lynch, Emergencia, Derecho, Justicia y Seguridad Jurídica 
(Reflexiones Sobre la Crisis y las Libertades Económicas), REVISTA JURÍDICA ARG. – 
LA LEY [L.L.] (2002). 
 12. JEROME SGARD, L’ECONOMIE DE LA PANIQUE: FAIRE FACE AUX CRISES 
FINANCIERES (2002).  
 13. This Article was finished in March 2008, well before the financial meltdown in 
the U.S. and in Europe.  For a useful report on the crisis in the thrift industry and its 
macro-economic origins, see United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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ment also adds, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”15  Similarly, the Argentine Constitution, 
enacted in 1853 and put into full force in 1860, establishes in Article 17, 
“Property is inviolable and no inhabitant of the Nation shall be deprived 
of it but in virtue of a court judgment founded on law.  Expropriation 
because of public utility must be so qualified by a law and previously 
indemnified.”16  The protection of private property in the Argentine 
Constitution is thus as robust as that afforded by the U.S. Constitution.  
Moreover, Article 14 of the Argentine Constitution guarantees inhabit-
ants the right to “use and dispose of property.”17 
In both U.S. and Argentine constitutional law, private property 
encompasses creditor rights arising out of contracts, such as bank de-
posits.  Indeed, this is the case in the U.S. Constitution as a result of the 
Contracts Clause in Article I, Section 10.18  Moreover, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that reliance interests are included in property.19  The 
Argentine Constitution is much the same.  The Argentine Supreme 
Court has declared that the term “property” covers “all interests a man 
can possess, outside himself, his life, and liberty, as well as all rights 
that have a recognized value, either emerging from private law relations 
or administrative acts.”20  More specifically, the Court has stated “it is 
also true that the rights awarded by a contract to the creditor constitute 
his property, as all the goods that form his patrimony, all of which are 
protected by the constitutional guarantee of Article 17.”21 
The current Argentine Constitution also lays down social and eco-
nomic rights that could conflict with property rights.  Thus, Article 14 
bis22, added in 1957, as well as various human rights provisions intro-
duced by the constitutional reform of 1994 through the incorporation of 
 15. Id. 
 16. CONST. ARG. art. 17. 
 17. Id. art. 14. 
 18. U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 10. 
 19. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 20. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 14/12/1925, “Bourdieu, Pedro 
E. v. Municipalidad de la Capital Federal,” Fallos (1925-145-307) (Arg.). 
 21. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 7/12/1934, “Avico, Don Oscar 
Agustín v. de la Pesa, don Saúl G. / sobre consignación de intereses,” Fallos (1934-172-
21) ¶5 (Arg.). 
 22. In Argentine legislative practice, the suffix “bis” serves to denominate a new 
article or clause when the lawmaker wants to avoid re-numbering all the subsequent 
articles or clauses. 
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international treaties, establish certain rights such as the right to decent 
housing and the right to basic welfare.23  Such rights could arguably 
justify the curtailment of private property.24  For instance, the American 
Convention on Human Rights provides:  “Everyone has the right to the 
use and enjoyment of his property.  The law may subordinate such use 
and enjoyment to the interest of society.”25  Though such provisions are 
absent in the U.S. Constitution, Scholar Frank Michelman has tried to 
infer social and economic rights from the Equal Protection Clause.26 
The U.S. and the Argentine constitutions establish two other kinds 
of powers that are relevant for this inquiry.  First, both the U.S. and the 
Argentine Constitutions afford Congress power over monetary policy.  
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress is 
empowered “[t]o coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign 
coin.”27  Article 75, paragraph 11, of the Argentine Constitution 
contains an identical provision.28  Second, in U.S. and Argentine 
constitutional law private property is consistent with bankruptcy law, as 
evidenced by Article I, Section 8’s declaration thatCongress shall have 
the power to establish “uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies 
throughout the United States.”29  Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
construed the Contracts Clause as consistent with state power to pass 
bankruptcy legislation that modifies remedies for breach of contract.30  
The Argentine Constitution has a similar bankruptcy provision in Article 
75, pa
 23. CONST. ARG, art. 14 bis., art. 75, ¶ 22 (articles incorporate various international 
treatises on Human Rights, such as the American Convention of Human Rights). 
 24. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 15/3/2007, “Rinaldi, Francisco 
Augusto y otro c/ Guzman Toledo, Ronal Constante y otra s/ ejecución hipotecaria,” 
Fallos (2007-330-855) (Arg.). 
 25. AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 21, ¶ 1, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) 
(emphasis added). 
 26. Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of 
Rawl’s Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 1005 (1973); Frank I. Michelman, The 
Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 11 (1969). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 28. CONST. ARG. art. 75. 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 30. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 
(1819). 
 31. CONST. ARG. art. 75. 
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III.  THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1929) AND THE ARGENTINE CRISIS (2001) 
The United States suffered bank runs in 1893, 1907, and during the 
Great Depression period.  In 1893 and 1907, the situation was handled 
through a privately concerted restriction of convertibility of deposits into 
currency.32  In the 1930s, however, the Federal Reserve System operated 
in a different way. 
The Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933 granted President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt emergency powers over banking transac-
tions, foreign exchange dealings, gold and currency movements.33  The 
next day, on March 10, the President issued a decree prohibiting gold 
payments unless permitted by the Secretary of the Treasury.34  On April 
5, a subsequent decree forbade the hoarding of gold and required all 
holders of gold to deliver their gold coins, bullion, or certificates to 
Federal Reserve Banks on or before May 1 (excluding rare coins, 
reasonable amounts for use in industry and the arts, and a maximum of 
$100 per person in gold coins and gold certificates).35  On January 30, 
1934, Congress passed the Gold Reserve Act, under which the President 
established a fixed buying and selling price of $35 per ounce for gold, 
thereby devaluing the gold dollar to 59.06 percent.36  According to the 
Gold Reserve Act, title to all gold coins and bullion was vested in the 
United States; all gold coins were withdrawn from circulation and 
melted into bullion; further gold coinage was to be discontinued; and the 
Secretary of the Treasury was to control all dealings in gold.37 
The model of crisis resolution established by the U.S. Federal 
Government during the Great Depression became very influential in 
Argentina.  The Argentine debacle in 2001 unfolded much like the Great 
Depression had, resulting in catastrophic effects on the country’s eco-
nomy.38  On November 30, fears of devaluation and deposit freeze 
 32. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 108-11, 156-63 (1963). 
 33. Id. at 421. 
 34. Id. at 422. 
 35. Id. at 462-63. 
 36. Id. at 469. 
 37. Id. at 469-70. 
 38. In fact, GDP fell 28%, and unemployment rose from 18.3% in 2001 to 23.6% 
in 2002.  Poverty rate rose from 25.9% in 1998 to 38.3% in 2001 and 57.5% in 2002.  
JIM SAXTON, VICE CHAIRMAN JOINT ECON. COMM., U.S. CONG., ARGENTINA’S 
ECONOMIC CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURES 1 (June 2003), available at http://www.house. 
gov/jec/imf/06-13-03long.pdf. 
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pushed interest rates in pesos to an average of 689% overnight, and the 
bank run accelerated at high speed.39  On December 1, 2001, the 
Argentine government announced a freeze on bank deposits.  Decree 
1,570/2001, Article 2, prohibited cash withdrawals of more than two 
hundred and fifty pesos ($250 pesos) or two hundred and fifty dollars 
(US$250) per week, made by any holder or holders from the total bal-
ance of the bank accounts opened with each financial entity.40  Minister 
Cavallo and President De la Rua were forced to resign on December 19 
in the midst of great social and political turmoil.  Then, from December 
20 through December 31, interim presidents Ramon Puerta, Adolfo 
Rodriguez Saa, and Eduardo Camaño took office.  Finally, on January 1, 
2002, the two Houses of Congress appointed Eduardo Duhalde as 
President and a series of measures were taken to address the disastrous 
situation.  First, Congress enacted the Public Emergency and Exchange 
Regulations Reform Law 25,561 (called “the Emergency Law”), which 
ended the “convertibility” monetary system that had been in effect since 
1991.41  This law also applied the exchange rate of one peso per US$1 
for a certain group of debts with financial entities, not exceeding the 
sum of US$100,000, including mortgage and individual loans.42  
Second, by Decree 71/2002, President Duhalde devalued the Argentine 
Peso to $1.40 per dollar for certain transactions, and established a 
managed floating rate system for all other operations and transactions.43  
Later, on February 4, the President issued Decree 214/2002, pursuant to 
which all bank deposits were “pesified” at $1.40 pesos per US$1 and 
revalued at various time periods.44  This order also provided for the 
application of an index of inflationary correction (“CER”) to all 
rescheduled bank deposits.45  Because Decree 214/2002 “pesified” loans 
with the financial system at $1.00 peso per US$1 – a measure that 
greatly benefited local and foreign corporations – the overall system was 
known as “asymmetric pesification.”46  The free exchange rate, on the 
other hand, which at the time was approximately $2.80 pesos per US$1, 
 39. Id. at 9. 
 40. Decree No. 1.570/2001 art. 2, Dec. 3, 2001, B.O. 29787 (Arg.). 
 41. Law No. 25.561, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810 (Arg.). 
 42. Id. art. 6. 
 43. Decree No. 71/2002 art. 1, Jan. 9, 2002, B.O. 29813 (Arg.). 
 44. Decree No. 214/2002 art. 2, Feb. 3, 2002, B.O. 29830 (Arg.). 
 45. Id. art. 4. 
 46. Gabriel Gómez-Giglio, Emergency Law and Financial Entities in Argentina, 10 
J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 397, 401 (2003). 
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doubled the “pesification” rate for depositors; the difference was even 
larger for debtors. 
Successive decrees and lower norms made it possible for depositors 
to obtain government bonds for the difference between the official and 
the free exchange rate.  On May 31, Decree 905/2002 granted depositors 
the option to swap all rescheduled deposits for government bonds in 
U.S. dollars (“Bodens”); depositors who did not opt for the swap were 
given certificates of rescheduled deposits (“Cedros”).47  Finally, Decree 
1836/2002 granted depositors various options to swap all or part of their 
Cedros for government bonds.48  The obvious goal of both decrees was 
to put 2001 depositors at a position no worse than those under the Bonex 
Plan, which is discussed further in Part IV of this Article. 
IV. THE EMERGENCY PARADIGM 
During the 1920s and 1930s, American constitutional jurisprudence 
analogized an economic and social emergency to war, thus justifying an 
encroachment of private property and freedom of contract as an exercise 
of Congress’s extraordinary powers during times of emergency.49 
It is common to regard emergency regulations – such as restriction 
or deferral of the convertibility of deposits into currency, as well as the 
compulsory currency conversion of bank deposits, bonds, and other 
creditor rights – as infringements of property rights and freedom of 
contract that are grounded on public interest reasons.50  Indeed, 
resolving an emergency situation seems to be the paradigm of serving 
the public interest.  The emergency paradigm allows individual rights to 
be sacrificed when necessary to avert a social or economic catastrophe. 
Emergency norms thus contradict ordinary norms.  However, this does 
impede the coherent functioning of the legal system: emergency norms 
simply suspend, during a period of time, the application of ordinary 
 47. Decree No. 905/2002, June 1, 2002, B.O. 29911 (Arg.). 
 48. Decree No. 1836/2002, Sept. 16, 2002, B.O. 2995 (Arg.).  A detailed account 
of all normative changes can be found in Gómez-Giglio, supra note 46, at 403, and 
Gabriel Gómez-Giglio, Argentina and the Changing Nature of Financial Regulation, 9 
J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 317 (2004). 
 49. Higgs, supra note 4, at 159-72. 
 50. Id. 
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norms.  During the state of emergency, ordinary norms are not rendered 
null, but rather their application is suspended.51 
From a philosophical viewpoint, it is interesting to observe that 
even natural rights theories do not necessarily dismiss the possibility 
that, under catastrophic conditions, it might be morally permissible to 
infringe on individual rights.52  Thus, Argentine Judge and law profess-
sor, Martín Farrell, contends that utilitarian considerations outweigh 
rights-based decision making when respecting individual rights will lead 
to tragic consequences.53  While a judge’s moral obligation is to enforce 
rights, under conditions of political unrest or social emergency, a judge 
can allow the infringement of individual rights if necessary to prevent 
tragic consequences.54 
When emergency measures are analyzed in terms of the property/ 
public interest matrix, two different normative stances are possible.  
Under a conservative-libertarian, Lochner-type approach, any infringe-
ment on private property that does not seek to prevent nuisance consti-
tutes compensable government taking.55  Alternatively, aligning with 
New Deal policy, Congressional legislation can legitimately curb private 
property rights in extenuating situations by simply alleging a public 
interest goal.56  Compensation is then only applicable in cases of physi-
 51. Ricardo Guarinoni, La emergencia y los jueces, in DERECHO, LENGUAJE Y 
LÓGICA 91 (2006). 
 52. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29-30 (Basic Books, Inc. 
1974).  In one of the most important natural rights treatises of the twentieth century, 
Robert Nozick says: “The question of whether these side constraints [individual rights] 
are absolute, or whether they may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral 
horror, and if the latter, what the resulting structure might look like, is one I hope large-
ly to avoid.”  Id. at 30. 
 53. Martín Diego Farell, Los planes económicos y la Corte Suprema, in FILOSOFÍA 
DEL DERECHO Y ECONOMÍA 15-16 (2006). 
 54. Id. at 17. 
 55. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 35-41 (1985). 
 56. The so-called Constitutional “Revolution” of 1937, which abolished substan-
tive due process, was completed in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
147 (1938).  Justification of encroachments on private property is often given in terms 
of fairness or mutual advantage.  See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public 
Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149, 160 (1971). 
2009 DON’T CRY FOR ME ARGENTINA 781 
 
cal invasion or significant reduction of economic value.57  Argentina 
followed the latter approach. 
The Argentine Supreme Court was ready to catch up with U.S. 
emergency doctrines as appropriate interpretations of the Argentine 
Constitution.58  The doctrine of Economic Emergency harks back to 
Ercolano v. Lanteri.59  However, in Horta v.Harguindeguy60 the Court 
declared that rights vested by fixed term contracts made before the 
emergency law could not be encroached on; in Mango v. Traba,61 the 
Court stressed that violations of the rights to use and dispose of property 
must not exceed the emergency period.62  Then, in the landmark 
decision of Avico v. de la Pesa, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
a law passed in 1933 that established a three-year moratorium on 
mortgage payments and foreclosures and capped the interest rate at six 
percent.63  This decision was influenced by the U.S. doctrines in Nebbia 
v. New York64 and Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell.65  
In Blaisdell, a Minnesota act imposed a limited moratorium on the fore-
closure of mortgages.  James W. Ely described the position of Chief 
Justice Hughes, who spoke for the Court: 
 57. See, e.g., Leif Wenar, The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1923, 1933 (1997). 
 58. For helpful works, see Alberto Garay, Federalism, The Judiciary, and 
Constitutional Adjudication in Argentina: A Comparison with the U.S. Constitutional 
Model, 22 INTER-AM. L. REV. 161, 173 (1991), William C. Banks & Alejandro D. 
Carrió, Presidential Systems in Stress: Emergency Powers in Argentina and the United 
States, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 63. (1993), and Jonathan Miller, Judicial Review and 
Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and its Collapse in Argentina, 
21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 77, 141 (1997). 
 59. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 28/4/1922, “Ercolano v. 
Lanteri,” Fallos (1922-136-161) (Arg.). 
 60. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 21/8/1922, “Horta v. 
Harguindeguy,” Fallos (1922-137-60) (Arg.). 
 61. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 26/8/1925, “Mango v. Traba,” 
Fallos (1925-144-219) (Arg.). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 7/12/1934, “Avico, Don Oscar 
Agustín v. de la Pesa, don Saúl G. / sobre consignación de intereses,” Fallos (1934-172-
21) ¶5 (Arg.). 
 64. 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). 
 65. 290 U.S. 398, 415 (1934). 
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Clearly influenced by the economic emergency, Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes ruled that contracts were subject to the 
reasonable exercise of the state police power.  The police power 
encompassed the authority to give temporary relief for extraordinary 
economic distress.  Although susceptible to a narrow construction 
limiting valid impairments of contracts to emergency situations, 
Hughes’s opinion also suggested in broad terms that the state’s 
interest in regulating economic affairs could justify interference with 
contracts. 66 
In Avico, by summarizing the requirements imposed in Blaisdell 
Attorney General Horacio L. Larreta submitted to the U.S. Supreme 
Court a four-prong test to determine the constitutionality of a mora-
torium.  Specifically, (1) the conditions existing must have created an 
emergency situation; (2) the fundamental purpose of the measure, and of 
government acts in general, is to safeguard the public and promote gen-
eral welfare to the people; (3) the postponement of mortgage foreclosure 
sales must be reasonable; and (4) the change in legislation must have 
been provided in a temporary manner.67 
Following Blaisdell, Larreta maintained that “a moratorium does 
not attack property, which is maintained with all its attributes, and only 
delays the application of the remedies that are available to the credi-
tor.”68  The Court stressed the difference between the substance of prop-
erty and the remedies for its protection by quoting the opinion delivered 
by Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges v. Crownishield.  Marshall pointed 
to the distinction between an obligation and the remedy to enforce it:69 
The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy 
given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at 
the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the 
obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as 
the wisdom of the nation shall direct.70 
Thus, the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and Argentine 
Supreme Court in Blaisdell and Avico, respectively, maintained that for 
emergency reasons, the federal government is allowed to modify the 
 66. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT, A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 121 (1998). 
 67. Avico, Fallos (1934-172-21) at 34-35. 
 68. Id. at 33. 
 69. 17 U.S. 122 (1819). 
 70. Id. at 200. 
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“time dimension” of property rights, provided this modification is 
reasonable.71 
The Argentine Supreme Court’s borrowing of the emergency para-
digm in Avico would prove useful many decades later in sustaining the 
constitutionality of emergency decrees in Argentine financial crises.  
The most important decision in this area came in the context of the eco-
nomic crisis of 1989, in the early days of President Menem’s ad-
ministration.  The President issued Decree 36/90, which converted time 
deposits into public bonds (“Bonex 1989”).72  The publicized goal of 
this measure was to reduce the burden of the increasing internal public 
debt.73  In the famous decision of Peralta v. Nación Argentina74 the 
Argentine Supreme Court acknowledged the constitutional validity of 
Decree 36/90 by invoking the doctrine used by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Blaisdell, already transplanted into Argentine law in Avico.  The 
Court defined “emergency” in Peralta as “an extraordinary situation that 
hovers over the economic-social order, with its burden of accumulated 
troubles, in the form of scarcity, poverty, penury or indigence, and 
creates a state of necessity which must be put to an end.”75 
Importantly, Peralta stretched the emergency paradigm beyond that 
which had been set forth in Blaisdell and Avico.  In essence, the Court in 
Peralta discussed two different issues: (1) whether the President posses-
ses emergency powers of a legislative nature, and (2) whether the rele-
vant authority (Congressional or Executive) can, in a state of emergency, 
defer the paying out of deposits by restructuring them into public bonds. 
Thus, Peralta introduces two possible sides to the doctrine of economic 
emergency:  functional emergency and regulatory emergency. 
A functional emergency occurs when the state of emergency can 
justify an alteration of the separation of powers established by the 
Constitution, so that the President can exercise, with or without 
Congress’s prior approval, powers ordinarily reserved to Congress.  A 
regulatory emergency, on the other hand, refers to the government’s 
 71. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY, ITS MEANING AND POWER 
28 (2003) (a four-dimensional analysis of property in which time is the fourth 
dimension). 
 72. Decree No. 36/90, Jan. 5, 1990, B.O. 26795 (Arg.). 
 73. PABLO GERCHUNOFF & LUCAS LLACH, EL CICLO DE LA ILUSIÓN Y EL 
DESENCANTO 430 (2003) 
 74. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 27/12/1990, “Peralta, Luis 
Arcenio v. Nación Argentina / acción de amparo,” Fallos (1990-313-513) (Arg.). 
 75. Id. at 571. 
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wider powers of regulatory interference with constitutional rights that 
are grounded on the need to protect fundamental public goals (e.g. the 
preservation of the whole constitutional order). 
In its assessment of regulatory emergencies, the Peralta Court 
apparently rested on the doctrines used in Blaisdell and Avico: 
In our law as well as in that of the United States of America, the laws 
dictated in emergency situations have not been taken to be outside 
the Federal Constitution in disregard of the right to property, when 
they either limited themselves to not suspending indefinitely the 
exercise of the creditor’s rights, or did not make difficult the fulfill-
ment of the obligations with excessively long terms.76 
However, Peralta equated a congressional moratorium (the meas-
ure challenged in Blaisdell and Avico) to a financial restructuring 
scheme introduced by Presidential decree, thus stretching the borrowed 
precedent from a regulatory emergency to a functional emergency.  
Moreover, Peralta lengthened a short-term moratorium in Blaisdell (just 
over two years) and Avico (three years) to a ten-year banking restruc-
turing (the “Bonex Plan”).  Therefore, by stretching the borrowed prec-
edent in all these ways, the Court concluded that the President has an 
emergency power to postpone the lawful exercise of property rights for 
ten years.  Further, in allowing such a postponement the Court did not 
require compensation.77 
Subsequently, in December 2001, when President de la Rua sus-
pended the convertibility of both demand and time deposits into cash by 
Decree 1,570/2001,78 it may have seemed that the Court would follow 
Peralta in testing the constitutional validity of the decree.  In fact, the 
Court rejected exceptional cautionary measures [amparos] in the so-
called Kiper case because they violated procedural due process.79  A few 
weeks later, however, the Court ruled in Smith that restrictions on bank 
withdrawals and the emergency measures described in Section III 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Decree No. 1.570/2002 art. 2, Dec. 3, 2001, B.O. 29787 (Arg.). 
 79. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 28/12/01, “Banco de la Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires s/ solicita se declare estado de emergencia economica,” Fallos (2001-
324-4520) (Arg.). 
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amounted to confiscation of property.80  Smith was a curious return to 
Lochner-style jurisprudence.  The Court declared: 
The right to freely dispose of the funds invested or deposited with 
banking and financial institutions is based on constitutional 
principles, regardless of any other legal standards acknowledging it.  
It is clear that any condition or restriction on such right will affect 
the intangibility of property and impair the goal of promoting justice.  
Such clashes with constitutional principles, given their seriousness 
and the absence of crucial reasons for them, cannot be understood as 
the result of reasonable regulations based on such principles, nor do 
they arise from Article 28 of the Constitution (Decisions 305:945, 
par. 8, last paragraph).  This is clearly the case of the situation at 
stake in the case sub lite, in which successive regulations went too 
far, imposing conditions and restrictions on the free disposal of 
private property that flagrantly violated the said constitutional 
principles.81 
The Court made an unconvincing attempt to distinguish the facts in 
Smith from those in Peralta by resorting to the doctrine of “vested 
rights”: 
In the light of the case law criteria mentioned above [vested rights 
cases], the plaintiff’s property has been violated, given that the 
deposits had been made while a system guaranteeing their 
inviolability was in force.  Furthermore, such guarantee had been 
recently strengthened by Law 25466, which had declared deposits 
intangible, with intangibility being defined as the impossibility by 
the State to alter the conditions agreed upon by deposit holders and 
the financial institution, as well as the prohibition to swap deposits 
for State bonds, postpone payments, or restructure their maturity 
(Sect. 1 to 4); these circumstances did, in fact, exceed those 
described in the Peralta case recorded in Fallos 313:1513.82 
Thus, one could argue that the Court considered the suspension of 
deposits’ intangibility by Emergency Law 25561,83 passed in January 
2002, as a new circumstance that was absent when it decided the Kiper 
 80. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 1/2/2002, “Smith, Carlos 
Antonio v. P.E.N. / medidas cautelares,” Fallos (2002-325-28) (Arg.). 
 81. Id. at 240. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Law No. 25.561, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810 (Arg.). 
786 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
case.  There is little doubt, however, that Menem’s appointees in the 
Court were mainly guided by political considerations.84 
In Smith, the Argentine Supreme Court justices (usually called the 
“automatic majority” because they generally voted en bloc in favor of 
President Menem’s policies) made an apparent preemptive strike to 
deter Duhalde’s impeachment plans.  Therefore, one could argue Smith 
must be given an externalist explanation, that is, an explanation that is 
not premised on judicial or doctrinal reasoning, but rather on political 
grounds.85  Apart from the political background of the decision – which 
was widely documented in Argentine newspapers – two reasons support 
this claim.  First, it is difficult to explain why the Court decided to 
adjudicate the substantive question of law in Smith, whereas it had 
declined to do so in Kiper. The Court’s explanation was simply not 
persuasive: “[T]he injunction requested and granted matches the object 
of the appeal.”86  In fact, the plaintiffs in both Kiper and Smith claimed 
the same cautionary injunctions through amparos.  Second, as Horacio 
M. Lynch observes, it was ironic that after decades of validating the 
most diverse invasions of private property and contractual freedom, such 
as minimum prices, rent control legislation, and freezing of deposits, the 
Argentine Supreme Court would suddenly return to a Lochner-type 
conception of private property and freedom of contract.87 
In Provincia de San Luis88, the last case on pesification decided by 
the so-called “automatic majority,” the Supreme Court restated the fun-
damental doctrines set forth in Smith.  The Court held that pesification 
of bank deposits went beyond the emergency powers because it altered 
the substance of the depositors’ property rights, instead of simply put-
ting off the remedies available to depositors.89  Justices Eduardo Moliné 
 84. Lynch, supra note 11, at 1298. 
 85. See Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive 
Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL. SC. REV. 291 
(2002) (an externalist explanation of doctrinal shifts in the Argentine Supreme Court).  
See generally Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 
110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052 (2005) (features a description of the internalist/externalist 
divide, and an internalist explanation of Supreme Court decisions during the New Deal 
that separates them from President Roosevelt’s “Court-packing” plan). 
 86. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 1/2/2002, “Smith, Carlos 
Antonio v. P.E.N. / medidas cautelares,” Fallos (2002-325-28) (Arg.). 
 87. Lynch, supra note 11, at 1287. 
 88. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 5/3/2003, “Provincia de San 
Luis v. Estado Nacional,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-I-188) (Arg.). 
 89. Id. at 29. 
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O’Connor and Guillermo A. F. López strongly emphasized Intangibility 
Law No. 25.46690 because, they declared, this law strengthened the 
constitutional protection of depositors’ vested rights.  The justices found 
that “the energetic wording of those norms uncontroversially reveals the 
existence of an economic policy addressed to capture deposits, creating 
for such purpose a high degree of trust, which public power defrauded 
almost immediately with the passing of those norms here questioned.”91  
The Court ordered Banco de la Nación Argentina (“the Nation”) to pay 
off the dollar deposits to Provincia de San Luis (the “Province”); it also 
instructed the Nation and the Province to agree on the method and dates 
of repayment within sixty days, without modifying the substance of the 
decision, under a penalty of the Court deciding the issues itself.92 
In 2004, a divided Court in Bustos overruled Smith and Provincia 
de San Luis and sustained the constitutionality of pesification.93  In 
Bustos, the majority of the Court went back to the doctrines in Avico and 
Blaisdell, that is, to the emergency paradigm.  According to Bustos, 
Congress or the President may establish pesification in a state of 
emergency.94 
Justices Augusto Belluscio and Juan Carlos Maqueda  offered a 
critical assessment of the economic policies adopted in the 1990s: 
[I]t is evident that the prolonged maintenance of an artificial value 
equivalence between the Argentine peso and the U.S. dollar, together 
with economic circumstances that the mentioned absence of 
evidence impedes to clarify, led to a process of worsening of the 
national productive apparatus – with its aftermath of 
unemployment, misery and hunger – to which the unusual 
interest rates offered for dollar deposits were relevant, to a threat of 
bank run that the Government tried to avert by means of these rates, 
and finally to a certain risk that that threat really should occur or 
start, which were the determinants of the measures adopted by the 
Executive Branch and the Congress with the goal of impeding the 
 90. Law No. 25.466, Sept. 25, 2001, B.O. 29739 (Arg.). 
 91. Provincia de San Luis, J.A. (2003-I-188) at 30. 
 92. Id. at 38. 
 93. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 10/26/2004, “Bustos, Alberto 
Roque v. E.N. / amparo,” J.A. (2005-III-189) (Arg.) (concurring opinion of Judges 
Augusto C. Belluscio and Juan C. Maqueda, Antonio Boggiano, Eugenio R. Zaffaroni, 
and Elena Highton de Nolasco). 
 94. Id. at 29. 
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generalized insolvency of the banking system and the subsequent 
ruin of all depositors.95 
Belluscio and Maqueda availed themselves once again of Larreta’s 
four-condition test and ruled that the test was met.  They even advanced 
an explanation of Argentina’s fall:  “It is undisputable . . . that devalu-
ation of national currency was an unavoidable measure in the face of the 
grave emergency resulting from the value disequilibrium vis-à-vis the 
U.S. dollar and the beginning of an important bank run.”96  Interestingly, 
Belluscio and Maqueda focused on real exchange overvaluation as the 
cause of the crisis, but did not mention fiscal sustainability and the stop 
of capital inflows.  The explanation of the Argentine crisis remains 
controversial in economic literature, with real exchange overvaluation 
being only one of the factors cited.97 
Today, the Court adheres to this emergency paradigm, though most 
federal courts still follow the doctrines of Smith and Provincia de San 
Luis.  In the recent Massa decision, the Court again applied the emer-
gency paradigm.98  It ruled that applying the conversion formula estab-
lished by Decree 214/2002 – in an extended version that also covers the 
period of legal proceedings – plus an annual interest rate fixed at four 
percent, does not cause economic damage when restitution is made at 
 95. Id. at 8. 
 96. Id. at 9. 
 97. See, e.g., Guillermo A. Calvo et al., Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate, and 
Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina’s Lessons, in EMERGING CAPITAL MARKETS IN 
TURMOIL: BAD LUCK OR BAD POLICY? (Guillermo Calvo ed., 2005); Sebastián 
Etchemendy, Old Actors in New Markets: Transforming the Populist/Industrial 
Coalition in Argentina, 1989-2001, in ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY, THE POLITICS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS (Steven Levitsky & María Victoria Murillo eds., 2005); 
Ricardo Hausmann & Andres Velasco, Hard Money’s Soft Underbelly: Understanding 
the Argentine Crisis, in BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM: 2002 61 (Susan M. Collins & Dani 
Rodrik eds., 2003); Augusto de la Torre et al., Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The 
Rise and Fall of Argentina’s Currency Board, ECONOMIA 8 (2003), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/Economia-DelaTorre-LevyYeyati-
Schmukler.pdf; Martin Feldstein, Argentina’s Fall: Lessons from the Latest Financial 
Crisis, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2002). 
 98. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 27/12/2006, “Massa, Juan A. 
v. E.N.”, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2007-II-185) at 13 (Arg.) (concurring opinion 
of Judges Elena Highton de Nolasco, E. Raúl Zaffaroni, Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti, and 
Carmen Argibay). 
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the time of the decision.99  Justices Elena I. Highton de Nolasco, E. Raúl 
Zaffaroni, and Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti held: 
[A]n interpretation contrary to this fundamental regime of economic 
working (the “emergency legislative bloc,” which includes the new 
exchange system), if adopted years after the implementation of this 
regime, would yield very grave institutional sequels, which is 
contrary to the interpretative standard that requires to ponder over 
the consequences that result from judicial decisions.100 
The Court declared in Peralta, Bustos, and Massa that it was 
following the doctrine in Blaisdell, and its Argentine analogue in Avico.  
In fact, however, the compulsory swap of deposits for public bonds in 
1991 and the conversion of dollar deposits into rescheduled peso 
deposits in 2002 nevertheless altered the substance of the obligations, 
thus violating the right to property (even considering the option to swap 
deposits for dollar denominated Government bonds).101  As noted above, 
Blaisdell and Avico made a crucial distinction between the substance of 
an obligation (e.g., a creditor right) and the remedies available to obtain 
its execution.  The emergency paradigm permits deferral of the available 
remedies when necessary to overcome the crisis, but it disallows even a 
temporary alteration of the nature of the underlying obligations.  A com-
pulsory swap for government bonds modifies the essence of an obliga-
tion because, among other things, it substitutes the government for the 
original obligor.  The same principle applies to the conversion of bank 
deposits into pesos at an official rate, because this conversion modifies 
the economic value of the deposit.102 
V.  THE MONETARY PARADIGM 
During the Great Depression, the U.S. Supreme Court did not return 
to Blaisdell in order to review gold dollar contracts after the abandon-
ment of the gold standard.  Though the Court discussed the abrogation 
of gold clauses under the rhetoric of emergency, its approach in these 
 99. Id. at 5. 
 100. Id. at 6. 
 101. Marta Macías, Revisión del fallo Bustos según la doctrina de sus precedentes. 
Análisis de la jurisprudencia citada en el voto de los Dres. Belluscio y Maqueda, S.J.A. 
(2005). 
 102. Justice Carmen Argibay expressed this opinion in her concurring opinion in 
Massa. 
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cases forms a different paradigm, the monetary paradigm.  President 
Roosevelt forbade, with certain exceptions, the commerce of gold 
throughout the entire nation; Congress redefined obligations fixed in 
gold dollars into obligations in unconvertible dollars.103  Chief Justice 
Hughes, speaking for the majority, distinguished between private and 
public contracts in five decisions usually known as the “Gold Clause 
Cases,” yet reaffirmed in all these cases comprehensive congressional 
power over monetary policy.  As Robert Higgs explains: “By validating 
the abandonment of the gold standard, [these decisions] released the 
federal government from a powerful restraint on its expansion of the 
money stock.  Not by coincidence has the subsequent half-century been 
an age of inflation.”104 
It is important to realize that the Supreme Court’s reasoning was 
quite different in the three private-contract and the two public-contract 
cases.105  In U.S. v. Bankers’ Trust Co.,106 and Norman v. Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co.,107 the Court addressed the validity of the Joint 
Resolution of June 5, 1933108 with respect to the “gold clauses” of pri-
vate contracts for the payment of money: 
Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority 
of the Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but, when 
contracts deal with a subject-matter which lies within the control of 
the congress, they have a congenital infirmity.  Parties cannot 
remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional 
power by making contracts about them.109 
Further, the majority opinion explained that it was neither a state of 
emergency, nor the consequences arising thereof, that mattered in its 
decision: 
We are not concerned with consequences, in the sense that conse-
quences, however serious, may excuse an invasion of constitutional 
right.  We are concerned with the constitutional power of the 
Congress over the monetary system of the country and its attempted 
frustration. . . .  The contention that these gold clauses are valid 
 103. H.R.J. 192, 73d Cong. (1st Sess. 1933). 
 104. HIGGS, supra note 4, at 186. 
 105. See John P. Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions, 33 MICH. L. REV. 647 (1935). 
 106. 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
 107. 293 U.S. 548 (1934). 
 108. H.R.J. 192. 
 109. 294 U.S. at 307-08. 
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contracts and cannot be struck down proceeds upon the assumption 
that private parties, and states and municipalities, may make and 
enforce contracts which may limit that authority.110 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of Government bonds in 
Nortz v. United States111 and Perry v. United States112, striking down the 
Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933.  This resolution had provided that 
clauses requiring payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or curren-
cy were against public policy, and that every obligation, theretofore or 
thereafter incurred, “shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, 
in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for 
public or private debts.”113  Government bonds fell under this resolution 
because they provided that the principal and interest would be payable 
“in United States gold coin of the present standard of value.”114  The 
Court declared in Perry that the Joint Resolution went beyond the 
Congressional power because it attempted to override the obligation 
created by the bond in suit.  “The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign 
power of the people to override their will as thus declared.”115  More-
over, the Perry court held, “[t]he action is for breach of contract.  As a 
remedy for breach, plaintiff can recover no more than the loss he has 
suffered and of which he may rightfully complain. He is not entitled to 
be enriched.”116 
As to the issue of how to establish the baseline for assessing com-
pensable damages, the Court said: “The question of actual loss cannot 
fairly be determined without considering the economic situation at the 
time the government offered to pay him the $10,000, the face of his 
bond, in legal tender currency.  The case is not the same as if gold coin 
had remained in circulation.”117  The Court did not consider the mere 
impossibility of converting the nominal amount of dollars into gold at 
the previous exchange rate as a compensable damage.  As Higgs says, 
 110. Id. at 316. 
 111. 294 U.S. 317 (1935). 
 112. 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 113. H.R.J. 192. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Perry, 294 U.S. at 353. 
 116. Id. at 354 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. at 355. 
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[the court] reached this conclusion by assuming that during 1933-
1934 the government could and did legitimately deny Americans 
recourse to foreign markets for gold and foreign currency linked to 
gold.  In other words, the government’s (unconstitutional) abrogation 
of its obligation to pay gold to bondholders has caused them no 
determinate harm because access to the markets wherein the value of 
the damages could have been established had been foreclosed by 
other (constitutional) governmental restrictions.118 
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, emphasized this 
point by asserting: 
Plaintiff demands the ‘equivalent’ in currency of the gold coin 
promised. But ‘equivalent’ cannot mean more than the amount of 
money which the promised gold coin would be worth to the 
bondholder for the purposes for which it could legally be used.  That 
equivalence or worth could not properly be ascertained save in the 
light of the domestic and restricted market which the Congress had 
lawfully established.119 
A logical conclusion, therefore, is that the monetary paradigm is 
relevant when denomination of liabilities in gold currency or foreign 
exchange (e.g., U.S. dollar) is a central component in a banking crisis.  
In fact, liability dollarization played a key role in the Argentine crisis, 
because the devaluation and abandonment of the currency board caused 
a severe balance-sheet mismatch in non-tradable sectors.120  However, 
the monetary paradigm does not really apply to the Argentine crisis.  
The Argentine Supreme Court adopted divergent stances on this issue.  
While Bustos generally adopted the emergency paradigm, Justices 
Belluscio and Maqueda invoked the monetary paradigm in their opinion 
by citing Perry.121  Their argument merits careful scrutiny.  The justices 
argued that “the supposed property of dollars was nothing more than a 
great fallacy.”122  They asserted this bold claim as follows: 
 118. HIGGS, supra note 4, at 187. 
 119. Perry, 294 U.S. at 357. 
 120. Calvo et al., supra note 97, at 144-45 (noting that liability dollarization was 
also important in the crises of Korea and Indonesia (1997) and Turkey (2001)). 
 121. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 10/26/2004, “Bustos, Alberto 
Roque v. E.N. / amparo,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2005-III-189) at 10 (Arg.). 
 122. Id. at 29. 
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In Argentina no one earned in American dollars, hence it follows that 
denominating bank deposits in that currency was either a way of 
using it simply as an accounting unit – no one is unaware that to a 
great extent pesos were deposited and that these were converted to 
an equal amount of dollars, an equivalence whose falsity became no-
torious if the impossible task was attempted to convert pesos for dol-
lars abroad (except in some neighboring countries), and whose fic-
titious nature is now very clearly seen – or of preparing the purchase 
of dollars at a low and base price – that of exchange rate . . . .123 
Thus, Justices Belluscio and Maqueda assumed that a currency 
board is a delusion because it maintains a convertible national currency 
(in which salaries, for instance, are still being denominated).  This is 
meaningless: it is like saying that the currency board is delusional be-
cause it is a currency board. 
The Argentine currency board lasted 10 years.  It is debatable 
whether it could have lasted longer under different fiscal conditions.  
But the important issue is that sustainability of an exchange system is 
quite different from its “ontological” status (as real or delusive).  For 
example, Hong Kong’s currency board has been operating since 1983 
with the Hong Kong dollar pegged at a fixed exchange rate to the U.S. 
dollar.  Is this fictitious?  A currency board is probably not the best ex-
change system for coping with the deflationary rigidities of modern 
democratic and unionized politics, as the Great Depression and 
Argentine crises have tragically shown.124  Yet a currency board is no 
less real than any other exchange system.  On the contrary, if “artificial” 
has any clear meaning in this context, it is evident that inconvertible 
paper money is more artificial than convertible paper money.  In the 
Court’s opinion, financial contracts denominated in U.S. dollars are 
always fictitious or fallacious under any exchange rate system except 
dollarization.  This is an unsupported claim.  The justices also failed to 
explain why bonds issued by a government in default (for which bank 
deposits could be swapped) were less “artificial” than dollar deposits 
under convertibility. 
After criticizing the currency board, Justices Belluscio and 
Maqueda held that depositors (at least those who do not prove that they 
need U.S. dollars for operations abroad) cannot claim damages against 
 123. Id. 
 124. Cf. Barry Eichengreen & Peter Temin, The Gold Standard and the Great 
Depression 15-16, 24-26, 37-38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
6060, 1997). 
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the State as a result of the compulsory pesification of bank contracts.  
Borrowing an argument from Perry, Belluscio and Maqueda stated: 
“pesification presents itself as reasonable as long as the amount to be re-
turned has the same or greater purchasing power than the original depos-
it, because this does not cause damage to the creditor.”125  Additionally, 
“in the absence of damage produced by the State, there is no action.”126 
The application of Perry to the Argentine pesification is flawed.  
Perry is not founded on the monetary paradigm, but rather on the prin-
ciple that a plaintiff must be compensated for breach of contract with 
expectation damages, in an amount not to exceed his expectation value.  
Therefore, Perry does not apply to the Argentine crisis for two reasons.  
First, Argentine law is a civil law system and the creditor always has 
recourse to specific performance as a remedy for breach of contract.  
This is strikingly different from the common law, where specific perfor-
mance is the exception rather than the rule.127  For example, the French 
Civil Code declares that contracts must be performed in good faith,128 
and stipulates that an obligation to give implies an obligation to deliver 
the thing, and to preserve it until delivery.129  Similarly, the Argentine 
Code stipulates that the creditor, in case of non-performance of a con-
tract, has the right to choose from among the following measures: (1) 
force performance of the obligation, (2) obtain performance by a third 
party at the debtor’s expense, or (3) obtain appropriate damages.130 
How is the specific performance of a money obligation to be deter-
mined?  In the civil law tradition, nominalism maintains that monetary 
obligations should be discharged at the numerical sum of the currency 
established in the contract.131 Traditionally, the French Civil Code132 and 
most Latin American codes embraced nominalism.  The Argentine Civil 
Code established nominalism in regards to money obligations in national 
currency (Article 619), but Article 617, under its original wording, 
 125. Bustos, Alberto Roque, J.A. (2005-III-189) at 29. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Horacio Spector, Fairness and Welfare from a Comparative Law Perspective, 
79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 528-30 (2004). 
 128. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1134 (Fr.). 
 129. In civil law, obligations are traditionally classified into three categories:  
obligations to give, obligations to do, and obligations not to do.  See SAUL LITVINOFF, 
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (1992). 
 130. CODIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] art. 505 (Arg.). 
 131. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN 
AMERICA 443 (1975). 
 132. C. CIV. art. 1895. 
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considered obligations to give money that lacked legal tender quality as 
an obligation to give goods (as opposed to money).133  Convertibility 
Law No. 23928 modified Article 617 by providing that obligations 
denominated in foreign currency were money obligations.134  It also 
amended Article 610 to apply nominalism to obligations denominated in 
foreign currency: “If the debtor’s obligation is to deliver a certain 
quantity of a certain kind of money, the debtor fulfills his obligation by 
giving the designated kind of money on the maturity’s day.”135  There-
fore, in the case of contracts denominated in dollars, the specified kind 
of money is dollars, and so the creditor can obtain specific performance 
of the obligation to give dollars.136 
Furthermore, unlike New Deal measures, Argentine Decree 
260/2002 allowed free circulation of the U.S. dollar and established a 
free exchange market.137  The Argentine government did not suppress 
the circulation of U.S. dollars, but rather substituted a dirty float138 for 
the currency board.  Pesification of bank deposits at the rate of $1.40 
pesos to US$1, unlike the repayment of private bonds in non-convertible 
dollars, implied high opportunity costs for dollar depositors; these costs 
remained under the new exchange rate system.  Therefore, even if ex-
pectation damages were applied, pesification caused real damage to de-
positors at the moment of its passage.139  Moreover, as Justice Argibay 
rightly pointed out in Massa, there was no evidence that the economic 
value fixed by Decree 214/2002 was equivalent to the capital deposited, 
 133. Id. art. 619. 
 134. Law No. 23.928, Mar. 28, 1991 [Art. 11] B.O. No. 27104 (Arg.). 
 135. Id. 
 136. This is a literal application of the Argentine Civil Code.  If the debtor is unable 
to give the designated kind at the maturity of the obligation, he defaults on it, but the 
obligation is not extinguished.  See Horacio Tomás Liendo (h.), Los pesificadores 
reniegan de su tempestad (genus nunquam perit), La Ley [L.L.] 1299, 1300-01 (2002-
F) (Arg.), available at http://www.liendo.com.ar/html/sitio/publicaciones/casopesifi 
cacion2.pdf.  Yet Congress could have modified Article 505 of the Civil Code laying 
down expectation damages as the only remedy for breach of financial contracts during 
the state of emergency. 
 137. See id. at 1305. 
 138. Dirty float (or managed floating rate system) is “[a] system in which a coun-
try’s currency is allowed to float freely in the foreign exchange market within certain 
bounds; drastic changes in the value of the currency are mitigated by central bank inter-
vention in the foreign exchange market.”  ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. 
TOLLISON, ECONOMICS 853 (1986). 
 139. Macías, supra note 101. 
796 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
because: (1) it is dogmatic to assume that the depositor intended to 
employ this capital for purchasing services and goods in the internal 
market; and (2) even within the internal market, some goods (i.e., real 
estate) increased in the same proportion as the U.S. dollar in the free 
exchange market.140 
Thus, it is not Perry or its brethren, but rather U.S. v. Bankers’ 
Trust Co., Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., and United States 
et al. v. Bankers’ Trust Co. et al., that became relevant for sustaining 
pesification.  As former Justices Moliné O’Connor and López held in 
Provincia de San Luis, Perry addressed the case of Government bonds, 
where the key statement was that Congress cannot exercise its monetary 
powers as a way of unilaterally modifying its own freely assumed 
obligations: 
The Constitution gives to the Congress the power to borrow money 
on the credit of the United States, an unqualified power, a power 
vital to the government, upon which in an extremity its very life may 
depend.  The binding quality of the promise of the United States is of 
the essence of the credit which is so pledged.141 
Given that this factual condition was absent in the Argentine cases, 
why did the Court get into trouble by invoking Perry instead of simply 
resorting to Norman, where the sovereign power of Congress freely 
reigns?142 
In the author’s view, unlike Justices Belluscio and Maqueda, Justice 
Highton de Nolasco correctly cited U.S. v. Bankers’ Trust Co in her 
opinion in Bustos, thus properly applying the monetary paradigm.  She 
explained that Convertibility Law 23928 “established the . . . converti-
bility with the U.S. dollar, a new and full-fledged nominalism, desindex-
ation, and the inclusion of foreign currency under the obligations to give 
 140. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 27/12/2006, “Massa, Juan A. 
v. E.N.,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2007-II-185) at 20 (Arg.). 
 141. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 5/3/2003, “Provincia de San 
Luis v. Estado Nacional,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-I-188) at 29 (Arg.). 
 142. Julio C. Crivelli, Se avecina un gravísimo error: la redolarización. Enseñanzas 
del fallo “Perry” v. Estados Unidos, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2002-IV-1404) 
(stating that the relevance of Perry had been wrongly stressed); see Eduardo Conesa, El 
caos monetario argentinode 2002  y su resolución (Ad impossibilia nemo tenetur), La 
Ley [L.L.] (2002-D-1201) (Arg.) (advocate of pesification mentions Norman). 
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sums of money as if it were national currency.”143  Echoing Arthur 
Nussbaum, Justice Highton drew a distinction between “legal tender” 
[curso legal] and “compulsory tender” [curso forzoso]. 
For Nussbaum, legal tender denotes the quality of non-refusable 
money, that is, the rule that the payee cannot refuse a payment in lawful 
money made by the payor.144  In contrast, compulsory tender is the in-
convertibility of paper money established by law; in other words, com-
pulsory tender likewise denotes an aspect of the relationship between the 
issuer and the holder of paper currency.145  In American history, the 
expression “legal tender” is associated with the Acts of 1862 and 1863, 
which made U.S. notes – i.e., nonconvertible paper money – a legal 
tender in payment of all debts, public and private.146  In Argentine 
history, the expression “compulsory tender” was used to the same effect: 
to denote the quality of legal tender as applied to paper money that has 
become inconvertible.  Like “legal tender” in the American sense, 
“compulsory tender” in the Argentine sense tends to signify the quality 
of legal tender of irredeemable paper money with respect to debts and 
taxes.147  Legal tender, as distinct from compulsory tender, can also exist 
in a convertibility regime.  “Legal tender” in this sense is much the same 
as national currency or lawful money.  Thus, pesos were not compulsory 
tender under the peg, but they certainly were legal tender, because only 
pesos had releasing power with respect to taxes and other State-related 
obligations. 
Highton claims that when Congress declares “compulsory tender”, 
it can also fix the exchange rate of the new inconvertible money.148  
Accordingly, Congress could follow three different variants: paper 
money could be established as compulsory tender (a) at par or face 
value, (b) at the market value, or (c) at some intermediate value between 
the nominal value and the market value.  Highton implied that Congress 
is empowered to opt for any of these alternatives, which means that it 
can fix a rate of $1.40 pesos for US$1.00, even when the free exchange 
 143. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 10/26/2004, “Bustos, Alberto 
Roque v. E.N. / amparo,” J.A. (2005-III-189) at 61 (Arg.). 
 144. NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 55-58. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Knox v. Lee & Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. 457 (1871); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 
U.S. 603 (1870); see also John Dawson & Frank Cooper, The Effect of Inflation on 
Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879, 33 MICH. L. REV. 852, 898-922 (1935). 
 147. PABLO GERCHUNOFF ET AL., DESORDEN Y PROGRESO 50 n.46 (2008). 
 148. Bustos, Alberto Roque, J.A. (2005-III-189) at 63. 
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rate is much higher.  This opinion overruled the doctrine in Gowland v. 
Mallmann, decided in 1886, according to which the establishment of 
paper money as legal tender does not mean that it must be accepted at 
par value or any other value lower than its market value.149  Therefore, 
the monetary argument, presumably embraced by Highton, states: (1) 
Emergency Law 25445150 changed the monetary system by establishing 
Argentine paper currency as compulsory tender by substituting the irre-
deemable peso for the convertible peso; (2) in passing this law, Congress 
exercised its sovereign powers to fix the exchange value of currency, 
and private contractors must accept compulsory tender at the parity fixed 
by Congress in cancellation of their dollar-denominated credits; and (3) 
this would mean that banks are entitled to pay off deposits in irredeem-
able pesos at the rate fixed by Congress. 
Though pesos became compulsory tender when the currency board 
was abolished, this did not establish pesification as a way of exercising 
congressional power to fix the exchange rate of inconvertible pesos.  In 
effect, in establishing nominalism, Articles 617 and 619, as amended by 
Convertibility Law 23.928,  provided that payment in dollars was the 
adequate form of paying off dollar-denominated obligations. Under con-
vertibility’s nominalism, neither dollars nor inconvertible pesos were 
compulsory tender simply because, by definition, there is no compulsory 
tender in a convertibility regime.  Though dollar convertibility can mis-
leadingly be assimilated to the classic currency board under the gold 
standard, the author contends that Norman is not applicable to the pesifi-
cation of dollar-denominated contracts. 
From 1899 to 1914 Argentina maintained a regime of gold con-
vertibility administered by a currency board.  Conversion Law No 3.871, 
passed on October 31, 1899, established gold convertibility of paper 
pesos.151  According to this regime – which would extend over a period 
of fifteen years – the currency board was to exchange paper pesos for 
gold pesos at the rate of 2.27 paper pesos to one gold peso.152 
The obvious difference between a gold standard currency board and 
a dollar currency board is that metal currency is coined by the govern-
 149. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 6/10/1985, “Gowland v. 
Mallmann,” Fallos (1985-29-304) (Arg.). 
 150. Law No. 25.445, June 25, 2001, B.O. 29675 (Arg.). 
 151. GERARDO DELLA PAOLERA & ALAN M. TAYLOR, STRAINING AT THE ANCHOR: 
THE ARGENTINE CURRENCY BOARD AND THE SEARCH FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILITY, 
1880-1935 120 (2001). 
 152. Id. at 119. 
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ment, while U.S. dollars are issued by a foreign government.  Conse-
quently, when contracts are denominated in the national currency, 
Congress’s power to coin or issue national currency and to regulate the 
value thereof can affect those contracts.  Congress can exercise this 
power either by introducing a new national currency or by varying the 
gold or dollar parity of the old currency.  This feature of the monetary 
paradigm can be described as Congress having the power to change the 
internal denomination of contracts.  In contrast, when contracts are law-
fully denominated in a foreign currency (external denomination), the 
Government cannot modify the economic value of those contracts by 
simply exercising monetary powers.  Private contracts in the gold clause 
cases were denominated in gold dollars and therefore, bond holders’ at-
tempt to maintain the gold clauses after Congress had established legal 
tender and prohibited the circulation of gold, were incompatible with 
Congress’s power to change the monetary system and establish legal 
tender. 
Still, bank deposits in the pesification cases were typically denomi-
nated in U.S. dollars, and the U.S. Government had already declared that 
paper dollars were legal tender in 1933.  As Justice Adolfo R. Vázquez 
wrote in Provincia de San Luis, Norman would have been relevant in the 
Argentine cases if bank deposits had been denominated in convertible 
pesos.153  The Court then could have truly argued that Congress’s 
“monetary sovereignty” implied that depositors could not claim con-
vertible pesos (or the amount of inconvertible pesos needed to purchase 
convertible pesos) in the free exchange.  Pesification of bank deposits 
denominated in U.S. dollars, however, was neither a monetary decision 
nor a necessary consequence thereof. 
VI. THE VALORIST PARADIGM 
The previous section of this Article concluded that the conversion 
of dollar deposits into peso deposits at an official rate lower than the free 
exchange rate was not a necessary consequence of Congress exercising 
its sovereign attributions over legal tender.  This is not to say that 
Argentine law disallows adaptations of the economic value of contracts 
when unforeseeable economic circumstances (i.e., different from those 
existing or foreseeable at the moment of the contract formation) break 
 153. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 5/3/2003, “Provincia de San 
Luis v. Estado Nacional,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-I-188) at 93 (Arg.). 
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the equilibrium of the contract, making its performance too onerous for 
one of the parties and therefore, inconsistent with equity.  Instead of 
contractual adjustment by changing the baseline for estimating expecta-
tion damages (for example, the strategy pursued in Perry v. United 
States), the traditional form of adjusting the value of contracts in civilian 
countries applies the revaluation principle, the theory of unforeseeability 
(“imprevision”), or related doctrines that adopt a valorist paradigm of 
monetary obligations.154  Valorism holds that debts must be discharged 
at their real economic value.155  This position was introduced by German 
jurisprudence.  The German hyperinflation of 1918 to 1923 depreciated 
all debts to an extreme degree, which made fulfillment at the nominal 
amount inconsistent with the civilian principles of bona fides and rebus 
sic stantibus (things thus standing).156  On November 28, 1923, the Fifth 
Senate of the Reichsgericht reversed its previous doctrine and issued the 
famous Aufwertungsurteil, which ordered the revaluation of a mortgage 
debt, thus adopting a position held by the Court of Appeals of Darmstadt 
in decisions of March 29 and May 18, 1923.157  The valorist paradigm 
became widely used in Latin America in order to readjust contract 
values that were affected by inflation.158 
Argentine civil courts, in effect, applied the valorist paradigm under 
the heading of “theory of imprevision” to uphold revaluation of depreci-
ated debts as a result of inflationary processes.  In the 1960s, courts 
abandoned nominalism by leveling up the nominal sums set in contracts, 
fixing periodic performances or postponed execution with a view to 
neutralize the distorting effects of inflation on the economic bases of 
those contracts.159  Thus, courts held that all contracts must be presumed 
to contain an implicit rebus sic stantibus160 clause.  On the basis of this 
principle, courts ruled that values set in contracts can be judicially recast 
 154. KARST & ROSENN, supra note 131, at 443-93. 
 155. Id. 
 156. RÜTHERS, supra note 5, at 64. 
 157. NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 206; RÜTHERS, supra note 5, at 64-69. 
 158. KARST & ROSENN, supra note 131, at 443-93. 
 159. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nacion [CSJN], 26/2/1964, “Felix 
Sola v. Colonies and Farmhouses El Rodeo,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (1964-III-
600) (Arg.). 
 160. “A tacit condition attached to all treaties to the effect that they will no longer be 
binding as soon as the state of facts and conditions upon which they were based changes 
to a substantial degree.”  ENotes.com - West’s Encyclopedia of American Law - Rebus 
Sic Stantibus, http://www.enotes.com/wests-law-encyclopedia/rebus-sic-stantibus (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2009). 
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if new circumstances emerge that were not foreseeable and that sub-
stantially alter the financial equation of the bargain.  Applying this doc-
trine, courts increased the nominal value of obligations fixed in contracts 
when this value was depreciated by inflation, or decreased it when per-
formance became excessively burdensome for one of the parties as a 
consequence of the dollar denomination of the contract obligations or 
the application of an index clause.  The Argentine Supreme Court up-
held revaluation in Pribluda de Hurevich v. Hernández161 and Provincia 
de Sante Fe v. Carlos Aurelio Nicchi162.  Justice José Francisco Bidau 
explained that “in the face of the persistence of this phenomenon 
[inflation] and the extremes it reaches at present, it is not possible to 
maintain legal principles that have become fictitious.”163  Following 
Hernández and Nicchi, various rulings held that revaluation was a way 
to protect the right to property and to maintain the economic value of 
debts.164  The 1968 reform of the Civil Code expressly laid down the 
theory of imprevision.165 The Supreme Court later endorsed the valorist 
paradigm in three 1976 decisions, declaring that failure to update the 
amounts of defaulted obligations would amount to a violation of the 
right to property.166 
Then, in the 1990s Argentina returned to nominalism in an attempt 
to stop a long process of inflation and currency depreciation.  Converti-
bility Law No. 23928167 established nominalism with respect to 
contracts in foreign currency by amending Articles 610 and 617 of the 
 161. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 30/11/1966, “Pribluda de 
Hurevich v. Hernández,” Fallos (1966-266-223) (Arg.). 
 162. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 26/6/1967, “Provincia de 
Sante Fe v. Carlos Aurelio Nicchi,” Fallos (1967-268-112) (Arg.). 
 163. Id. at 116. 
 164. For a helpful list of cases asserting that the revaluation of the original amount 
does not make the debt more onerous bust just maintains its economic value, see 
NARCISO J. LUGONES ET AL., LEYES DE EMERGENCIA, DECRETOS DE NECESIDAD Y 
URGENCIA 164 nn.199 & 202 (1992). 
 165. CÓD. CIV. art. 1198 (Arg.). 
 166. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 9/9/1977, “La Amistad SRL v. 
Iriarte Roberto Co.,” Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (1977-IV-3) (ARG.); Corte 
Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 23/9/1976, “Jose Raquel Valdez v. Nacion 
Argentina,” Fallos (1976-295-937) (Arg); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación 
[CSJN], 21/5/1976, “Amalia Camusso Vda. de Marino v. S.A. Perkins,” Fallos (1976-
294-434) (Arg.); see also Genaro R. Carrió, Judge Made Law Under a Civil Code, 41 
LA. L. REV. 993 (1981). 
 167. See Law No. 23.928, Mar. 28, 1991, [Art. 11] B.O. No. 27104 (Arg.). 
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Civil Code.168  Argentine courts were not allowed – and indeed had no 
need – to go back to the valorist paradigm during the convertibility 
decade (1991-2001).  In January 2001, amidst the crisis, Article 5 of 
Emergency Law No. 25561169 maintained the wording of Articles 610 
and 617 of the Civil Code established by the Convert
As explained above, imprevision theory indicates a leveling up of 
nominal amounts as the natural response to depreciation of the currency 
in which contracts are denominated.  In contrast, leveling down of 
nominal amounts would seem to be the natural response for the converse 
problem, when the economic value of contracts increases due to strong 
deflation or appreciation of the currency in which contracts are denom-
inated.171  Though downward adjustment was never applied in such a 
pure form in Argentina, there was a case of scaling down when 
President Alfonsín issued the emergency Decree No. 1096/1985. This 
decree created a new currency (“Australes”) and converted all indexed 
debts denominated in the old currency (“Argentine Pesos”) into 
Australes at a rate that periodically increased the value of Australes to 
make up for Argentine Pesos indexation.172  The Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of this decree.  In Provincia de la Pampa v. Esteban 
Albano, the Court ruled that striking down Decree 1096/1985 for 
violating the right to property would have required a demonstration that 
the purchasing value on the maturity date was less than the value of the 
nominal capital would have been if inflation remained at a similar level 
as at the time of contract formation.173 
The valorist paradigm is thus one possible strategy to deal with U.S. 
dollar denominated contracts when the depreciation of the national 
currency causes an increase in the domestic purchasing power of the 
dollar.  In other words, when the national currency is unforeseeably de-
valued and, as a result, the economic basis of U.S. dollar denominated 
contracts is seriously altered, Congress or courts could apply the valorist 
paradigm in such a way as to reduce the nominal sum of dollars owed by 
 168. CÓD. CIV. arts. 610, 617. 
 169. Law No. 25.561, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810, art. 5 (Arg.). 
 170. C. CIV. art. 1895 (Fr.). 
 171. CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 281 (1982). 
 172. Decree No. 1096/1985, June 17, 1985, B.O. 24/VI/1985 (Arg.). 
 173. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 28/6/1988, “Provincia de la 
Pampa v. Esteban Albano S.A.,” Fallos (1988-311-1155) ¶ 5 (Arg.).  The same position 
is maintained in Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 20/4/1989, “Luis A. 
Porcelli v. Banco de la Nacion Argentina,” Fallos (1989-312-555) (Arg.). 
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debtors to banks, and by banks to savers.  Under the valorist paradigm, 
however, Congress or courts could not vary the currency denomination 
of contractual sums.  The valorist paradigm allows only a variation of 
nominal amounts and not a change in currency denomination. 
As already noted, the valorist paradigm is well rooted in the 
Argentine civil law tradition.  It is easier for civilian courts to apply the 
valorist paradigm than to utilize the emergency and the monetary 
paradigms, which are both ultimately borrowed from U.S. sources.  
Emergency Law No. 25561, however, did not apply the valorist para-
digm for restructuring deposits and loans within the banking system in 
the Argentine crisis.174  On the contrary, that law explicitly maintained 
nominalism.175  The obvious question then, is why was the valorist alter-
native not invoked?  Initially, it is important to note that the pure form of 
applying the valorist paradigm would have been to reduce the nominal 
amount of dollar denominated deposits to match the deposit pre-devalu-
ation real value.  If depositors are perfectly rational, this might have 
exacerbated the existing demonstrations against the restructuring of 
financial contracts. 
Suppose, hypothetically, a deposit of US$1,000 before the crisis at 
a parity of US $1 per $1, the peso is devalued up to a rate of $2 per US 
$1; it is certain that the Government can only take one of the following 
options: (i) pesify the deposit and nominally increase it by 20%, or (ii) 
maintain the deposit in dollars but nominally decrease it by 40%.  The 
former case yields $1,200; the latter yields US$600.  Which option is 
less attractive?  Despite a lack of experimental studies on this issue, a 
substantial majority would likely answer that they dislike the second 
option more, because this option vividly conveys a subjective feeling of 
loss.176  Of course, a perfectly rational agent would answer the question 
on the basis of an ex ante estimation of the probability of devaluation or 
revaluation of the peso until maturity of the obligation. 
Article Eleven of Emergency Law No. 25561, however, did apply 
an impure variant of the valorist paradigm – called “burden sharing” – to 
 174. Law No. 25.561 art. 7, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810 (Arg.). 
 175. Id. 
 176. This is probably related to an asymmetry noted by Kahneman and Tversky: 
people have greater aversion to losses than to objectively equivalent foregone gains.  Cf. 
Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
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mortgage loans outside the financial system.177  This variant allows 
pesification and therefore bypasses the problem of imperfect rationality 
indicated above.  Article Eleven awarded the parties to such contracts a 
period no longer than 180 days to reach an agreement on the readjust-
ment of the contract in such a way as to equitably share the burdens of 
the devaluation.178  In the absence of agreement, the norm allowed the 
parties to have recourse to the official system of mediation and to start 
legal proceedings; the Executive Branch was empowered to issue exe-
cutive orders readjusting the obligations on the grounds of the theory of 
imprevision (Article 1198 of the Civil Code) and the principle of 
“burden sharing.”179  Decree 214/2002 then pesified and indexed these 
loans (by consumer product prices or wages, depending on the amount 
and nature of the loan).180  The decree also provided that judges should 
proceed to a fair revision of loans if the adjusted debt was disproportion-
ately lower or higher than the value of the thing purchased at the 
moment of payment.181 
On the basis of Article Eleven of Law No. 25561 and Decree 
214/2002, a prevailing trend of doctrinal opinion in Argentina defended 
judicial revision of the value of contracts denominated in dollars, in the 
form of conversion into pesos at an intermediate rate resulting from 
splitting the difference between $1 and the free market exchange rate.182  
 177. Law No. 25.561 art. 11, Jan. 6, 2002, B.O. 29810. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Decree No. 214/2002, Feb. 3, 2002, B.O. 29830, art. 2 (Arg.). 
 181. Id. art. 8. 
 182. See, e.g., Ariel Ariza, Revisión judicial de los contratos en la emergencia 
económica, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] 9 Número especial (2002) (Arg.); Juan José 
Casiello, El impacto de las normas de emergencia en el derecho monetario. La 
‘pesificación’, La Ley [L.L.] 19 (2002) (Arg.); Gabriel B. Chausovsky & Ángel L. 
Moia, Un caso de equitativa recomposición de la obligación de dar moneda extranjera 
entre privados alcanzado por la legislación de emergencia, Jurisprudencia Argentina 
[J.A.] (2003-IV-590) (Arg.); Andrés Gil Domínguez, La teoría del esfuerzo compartido 
y los depósitos bancarios, La Ley [L.L.] (2004-1) (Arg.); Alejandro Gaido, La 
naturaleza jurídica del esfuerzo compartido, El Derecho [E.D.] (2004-209-793) (Arg.); 
Carlos G Gerscovich, Discordancias de la pesificación en el marco de la crisis y la 
emergencia, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-34) (Arg.); Lilian N. Gurfinkel de 
Wendy, Algo más sobre la teoría del esfuerzo compartido: estado actual de la 
jurisprudencia, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-III-674) (Arg.); Francisco 
Junyent Bas, Pesificación. Los contratos privados, las deudas en mora y la teoría de la 
imprevisión y el esfuerzo compartido, El Derecho [E.D.] (2003-202-779) (Arg.); Jorge 
W. Peyrano, La pretensión distributiva del esfuerzo compartido. Análisis provisorio de 
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While doctrinal commentators widely endorsed an equal splitting of the 
difference, civilian courts were divided between equal splitting and a 
strong debtor-relief splitting of thirty percent to seventy percent.183  In 
all cases, judicial revision of loans was defended on the grounds of 
contractual equity and good faith. 
Law 25798 (modified by Law 25908 and regulated by Decree 
1284/2003) created a system of mortgage restructuring by which Banco 
de la Nación Argentina reimburses the original debtor for the difference 
between the pesified debt and the readjusted debt.184 This system sought 
to relieve debtors who took loans of under $100,000 to purchase resi-
dential property.  Finally, Article Six of Law 26167 established that 
judges should make the equitable readjustment of contract under the 
doctrines of unforseeability, unfair enrichment, abuse of rights, and 
unconscionability, as well as the constitutional rights of access to decent 
housing and the protection of family.185  It also established that judges 
could not readjust debts so that the revised amount exceeded the pesified 
debt at a rate of US$1 to $1 peso plus thirty percent of the difference 
between this rate and the free exchange rate.186 
In Rinaldi, decided on March 15, 2007, the Supreme Court 
sustained the constitutionality of this regime and overturned a Civil 
Court of Appeals decision that had split the difference by fifty per-
cent.187  The Court ruled that the conflict between creditors and debtors 
must be resolved by restoring the economic equilibrium lost by the great 
aspectos procesales de la ‘pesificación’, Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] Tomo (2002-I-
1078) (Arg.); Jorge W Peyrano, Una nueva pretensión: la distributiva del esfuerzo 
compartido. Comentarios procesales sobre el régimen de ‘pesificación’ forzosa de 
obligaciones en moneda extranjera no vinculadas al sistema financiero, El Derecho 
[E.D.] (2002-196-861) (Arg.); Ramón Daniel Pizarro, La Degradación del Derecho de 
crédito en la Argentina, La Ley [L.L.] (2002-50) (Arg.); Roberto A. Vázquez Ferreira, 
Cambio de circunstancias y distribución del riesgo contractual, La Ley [L.L.] (2002-
40) (Arg.). 
 183. Ethel Humphreys, La hipoteca: pesificación, dolarización y esfuerzo 
compartido. Panorama jurisprudencial de la C. Nac. Civ. de la Capital Federal, 
Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-IV-1555) (Arg.). 
 184. Law No. 25.798, Nov. 7, 2003, B.O. 30272 (Arg.). 
 185. Law No. 26.167, Nov. 29, 2006, B.O. 31043 (Arg.). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 15/3/2007, “Rinaldi, Francisco 
Augusto y otro v. Guzman Toledo, Ronal Constante y otra s/ ejecución hipotecaria,” 
Fallos (2007-330-855) (Arg.). 
806 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
devaluation of the peso.188  Of course, this is essentially the theory of 
imprevision laid down in Article 1198 of the Civil Code.  The Court 
thus defended the constitutionality of a legislative scheme based on the 
idea of burden sharing. 
Burden sharing is a morally attractive notion – more so than the 
idea that individual rights may be sacrificed for the sake of the collective 
good.  It is central to the emergency paradigm.  On the basis of burden 
sharing, pesification at an intermediate rate could have been applied to 
all financial contracts, without recourse to the emergency and the 
monetary paradigms.  The question remains:  why was this paradigm not 
used? 
The explanation is not doctrinal, but rather political.  First, in 
Argentina and elsewhere, banks are not regarded as contributors to 
social welfare but rather as powerful and greedy organizations, in 
defense of which it would have been only grotesque to wield the theory 
of imprevision and moral arguments grounded on equity.  This is par-
ticularly important in a country like Argentina, where public discourse is 
largely insensitive to the propositions of economic theory and the results 
of experimental economics.189  It would have been politically impracti-
cable for the Government to apply the theory of imprevision, especially 
under the burden sharing variant, to defend banks and curtail savers’ 
rights. 
Rent seeking also explains why the valorist paradigm was not an 
attractive option for restructuring banking deposits and loans.  “Asym-
metrical pesification” at a $1 to US $1 rate was more profitable for rent 
seekers (i.e., politically connected corporate debtors) than burden 
sharing.  The upshot of “asymmetric pesification” was that, while large 
tradable sector corporations enjoyed a pre-devaluation exchange rate for 
paying off their debts to banks, individual debtors who took mortgage 
loans in notaries’ bureaus to buy their homes had to pay $1.40 pesos for 
each U.S. dollar borrowed.190  Thus, while the valorist paradigm and 
equity guided the restructuring of small mortgage loans in the informal 
financial sector, realpolitik led the way for liquefying corporations’ 
dollarized debts. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO R. TESÓN, RATIONAL CHOICE AND 
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE (2006) (a path-
breaking theory of public discourse in democratic regimes). 
 190. Decree No. 214/2002 of Feb. 3, 2002, B.O. 29830, art. 3 (Arg.). 
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VII. THE SOCIAL JUSTICE PARADIGM 
The social justice paradigm derives from a doctrine concerning the 
social function of property, embraced by socialist thought and the 
Catholic Church.191 This paradigm maintains that the reshaping of prop-
erty in financial crises must be accomplished by assigning priority to the 
worst off.192  The Government and courts should therefore ensure that as 
a result of such reshaping, the greater burdens befall the best off, and the 
lesser ones fall on the worst off.  Under this scheme, small debtors and 
depositors are prioritized, particularly when information about the 
overall economic condition of each debtor or depositor is difficult to 
obtain. 
Though the social justice paradigm did not guide the reshaping of 
property rights in Argentina, it played a role in a number of “exceptions” 
laid down by Presidential or Ministerial regulations.  For example, 
Resolution Number 46, issued by the Ministry of Economy on February 
6, 2002, allowed all individuals or corporations to exclude deposited 
amounts from the rescheduling if such amounts were applied to the pay-
ment of salaries and wages, payments related to social security, sever-
ance payments, compensation for death or accident, disability insurance, 
and payment of social security benefits, under certain conditions.193  
Similarly, Decree 905/02 gave an option to swap rescheduled deposits 
for Bodens in U.S. dollars to:  (1) holders of deposits of amounts up to 
US$10,000; (2) depositors over 75 years of age; and (3) individuals with 
severe health afflictions or severance payments beneficiaries.194  Such 
exceptions are justified on social justice or humanitarian grounds and 
have little economic impact.  Rather than an independent paradigm, they 
are indispensable qualifications to any of the other paradigms. 
Nevertheless, the social justice paradigm found articulate expres-
sion as an independent paradigm in two judicial opinions:  Bustos and 
Rinaldi.  Though these opinions did not constitute the holding of the 
majority decisions, they indicate that the social justice paradigm was 
starting to have a hold over the Supreme Court.  Thus, in a minority 
 191. See encyclicals of Pius XI, John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul II mentioned supra 
note 6. 
 192. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, Revised Edition (1999); Derek Partit, 
Equality and Priority, in IDEALS OF EQUALITY (Andrew Mason ed., 1998) (The social justice 
paradigm comes close to Rawls’s theory of justice). 
 193. Resolution No. 46 art. 2, Feb. 7, 2002, B.O. 29833 (Arg.). 
 194. Decree No. 905/2002, June 1, 2002, B.O. 29911 (Arg.). 
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opinion in Bustos, Justice Eugenio R. Zaffaroni differentiated three 
groups of depositors in terms of their economic capacity:  (a) holders of 
deposits exceeding US$140,000, (b) holders of deposits in the 
US$70,000-140,000 range, and (c) holders of deposits of less than 
US$70,000.195  Zaffaroni proposed a different solution for each group.  
He opined that the largest burdens deriving from the state of necessity 
should fall on group (a), to which pesification at the $1.40 peso per 
dollar rate, plus correction by “CER”, was constitutionally applicable.196  
Group (c), which Zaffaroni presumed as the worst off, was entitled to 
receive the amount of pesos needed to purchase the original amount of 
deposited dollars in the free exchange market.197  A mixed solution was 
suitable for group (b): for deposits up to US$70,000 they would be 
treated like group (c) and, for the amount ranging between US$70,000 
and US$140,000, they would be treated like group (a).198  Notably, 
Justice Zaffaroni invoked no constitutional text in support of his redis-
tributive scheme; he simply stated that it is “fair” to allocate burdens in 
proportion to the amount of the deposits.199 
In Rinaldi, Justices Maqueda and Highton de Nolasco declared that 
the restructuring mechanism established by Law 26167 is coherent with 
Article Fourteen bis of the Constitution and various international treaties 
incorporated into the Argentine Constitution in 1994, which protect 
family and the access to decent housing.200  Maqueda and Highton de 
Nolasco also stated that this decision resolves the conflict between credi-
tors’ constitutional right to property and debtors’ constitutional right to 
housing, because the law makes both parties share the burden of re-
adjustment.201  In his dissent, Justice Carmen Argibay said: 
[T]here is a serious internal contradiction in the view that finds a 
conflict or tension between the creditor’s right to foreclose the 
mortgage and the debtor’s right to decent housing.  The thing that 
works as housing is also an economic good that can be used by his 
owner to obtain money, be it through its sale, or through its being 
used as collateral . . . .  Therefore, if the thing is an economic good at 
 195. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 10/26/2004, “Bustos, Alberto 
Roque v. E.N. / amparo,” J.A. (2005-III-189) at 49 (Arg.). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. “Rinaldi,” Fallos (2007-330-855) at ¶45 (Arg.). 
 201. Id. ¶46. 
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the moment of its sale or being affected as collateral, it also must be 
an economic good at the moment of its delivery to the buyer or to the 
creditor who forecloses the mortgage.202 
The social justice paradigm has two obvious shortcomings.  First, 
the assumption that by differentiating groups of depositors by the 
amounts deposited, the Court can achieve social justice is a something of 
a fiction.  For example, the rich could have large deposits in off shore 
banks, thus eluding their justice-based obligations.  They could also in-
vest in real property, luxury goods, or paintings.  Taxation and a redis-
tributive scheme based on universal criteria, like a basic minimum in-
come, are far more efficacious ways of achieving social equality.  
Second, differentiating property protection in terms of the amount de-
posited, if generalized, would produce a stunted banking system in 
Argentina; it would encourage depositors of amounts exceeding 
US$70,000 to run away from the local banking system.  Curiously, 
Justice Zaffaroni said in Bustos, “[I]t is important that small and medium 
depositors preserve their trust in the banking system, both to promote 
those sectors’ savings and to avoid the holding of money and titles 
outside the banking system, with the resulting dangers of victimization 
in moments of social conflict.”203  Justice Zaffaroni failed to mention the 
importance of maintaining the trust of large depositors.  Perhaps 
Zaffaroni thought that large depositors would not remain in the 
Argentine banking system.  But, of course, the Court’s decisions are not 
exogenous to this expected event.  Large depositors could maintain a 
greater degree of trust if the Court acknowledged their claims.  Justice 
Highton de Nolasco’s doctrine that the protection of creditors’ rights can 
in principle be qualified by debtors’ rights to housing would, in cases of 
conflict between these two kinds of rights, also reduce the size of 
domestic financial markets.  Because the right to housing could system-
atically threaten mortgage credits, this doctrine would deter lenders from 
supplying mortgage credits in Argentina. 
Social justice doctrines that create legal uncertainty in savers and 
investors are typically counter-productive:  they hurt the group that they 
seek to defend, namely, the worst off.  The lack of a large banking sys-
tem generally yields deleterious effects on undercapitalized individuals.  
For instance, the undersupply of mortgage creditors deprives many in-
dividuals from a decentralized form of access to decent housing.  Of 
 202. Id. ¶32. 
 203. Bustos, Alberto Roque, J.A. (2005-III-189) at 49. 
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course, Argentina already has stunted financial markets as a result of 
repetitive waves of macroeconomic collapses and emergency decrees.  
By discouraging sizable bank deposits and mortgage credits, Zaffaroni’s 
and Highton de Nolasco’s doctrines would only exacerbate this problem.  
However, the Court could still endorse these doctrines on moral 
grounds, regardless of their consequences.  On the one hand, Justice 
Zaffaroni was concerned about some consequences (“dangers of victim-
ization”).204  On the other hand, as Guido Pincione and Fernando Tesón 
have shown, counterproductive public discourse (within which some 
judicial opinions might be included) could hardly become transparent 
moral discourse.205  If a judge acknowledged that the moral doctrine she 
defends would damage the worst off, her discourse would be prag-
matically self-defeating and morally counter-productive, because by this 
acknowledgement she would cancel the persuasive force of her doctrine.  
Because moral language has a persuasive function, counter-productive 
public discourse presents an ineradicable tension between transparency 
and pragmatic effectiveness.206 
VIII. THE BANKRUPTCY PARADIGM 
The application of the emergency and monetary paradigms to deal 
with the Argentine crisis was beset by doctrinal difficulties.  The 
Argentine Government and courts failed to discuss alternative constitu-
tional paradigms for designing the reshaping of property rights. 
This Article suggests, in particular, that an important paradigm has 
been ignored, called the bankruptcy paradigm.  This paradigm is wholly 
consistent with the property and contract structure of liberal constitu-
tional regimes.  More generally, this Article asserts that it is important to 
analyze the benefits of implementing a standing scheme of crisis reso-
lution under a new paradigm that could minimize the damage to the 
property and contract structure.  This is necessary to develop a financial 
and banking system, capable of fostering citizens’ well being and of 
financing innovative entrepreneurial initiatives.  Emerging market coun-
tries, where new crises cannot be discarded off hand, would be well 
 204. Bustos, Alberto Roque, J.A. (2005-III-189) at 49. 
 205. See PINCIONE & TESÓN, supra note 189, at 142-75 (an excellent analysis of the 
“moral turn” in counter-productive public discourse). 
 206. The form in which this point is expressed owes much to Ezequiel Spector’s 
thoughtful comments on Pincione and Teson’s theory.  Id. 
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advised in investigating the economic and legal underpinnings of this 
proposed scheme. 
The emergency view of government takings in the midst of 
financial crises is strengthened by the fact that the public is unaware of 
the technicalities of the banking system.  For instance, many small 
depositors are unaware that even solvent banks cannot pay a majority of 
their liabilities on demand.  Milton Friedman illuminates this point: 
It is easy to see why a run would cause an insolvent bank to fail 
sooner than it otherwise might.  But why should a run cause a 
responsible and solvent bank trouble?  The answer is linked to the 
one of the most misleading words in the English language – the word 
“deposit,” when used to refer to a claim against a bank.  If you 
“deposit” currency in a bank, it is tempting to suppose that the bank 
takes your greenbacks and “deposits” them in a bank vault for 
safekeeping until you ask for them.  It does nothing of the kind.  If it 
did, where would the bank get income to pay its expenses, let alone 
to pay interest on deposits?  The bank may take a few of the 
greenbacks and put them in a vault as a “reserve.”  The rest it lends 
to someone else, charging the borrower interest, or uses to buy an 
interest-bearing security. 
If, as is the typical case, you deposit not currency but checks on 
other banks, your bank does not even have currency in hand to 
deposit in a vault.  It has only a claim on another bank for currency, 
which it typically will not exercise because other banks have 
matching claims on it.  For every $100 of deposits, all the banks 
together have only a few dollars of cash in their vaults.  We have a 
“fractional reserve banking system.”  The system works very well, so 
long as everyone is confident that he can always get cash for his 
deposits and therefore only tries to get cash when he really needs it. 
Usually, new deposits of cash roughly equal withdrawals, so that the 
small amount in reserve is sufficient to meet temporary dis-
crepancies.  However, if everyone tries to get cash at once, the 
situation is very different – a panic is likely to occur, just as it does 
when someone cries “fire” in a crowded theatre and everyone rushes 
to get out.207 
The bankruptcy paradigm arises from the recognition that bank-
ruptcy legislation must be understood as consistent with protection of 
private property.  True, it has been held that bankruptcy law is incon-
sistent with a libertarian system of property rights because it allows the 
 207. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 72-73 (1990). 
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non-contractual extinction of the insolvent debtor’s debts and, in doing 
so, legitimizes the non-voluntary transfer of creditor rights.208  As 
Robert Nozick himself admits, it is always problematic for the natural-
rights tradition to accommodate risk-spreading schemes in a principled 
way.209  The author concedes that Nozick’s point can be extended to the 
reshaping of property rights under a bankruptcy regime.  However, 
bankruptcy procedures are consistent with the right to property as 
established in a classical liberal constitution.  In fact, as discussed in Part 
II of this Article, both the United States and Argentine constitutions 
empower Congress to pass bankruptcy legislation.  Today, bankruptcy 
legislation enjoys widespread acceptance in liberal democratic countries 
and, therefore, any theory about property rights should accommod
fact. 
Instead of passing emergency legislation when there is a crisis in 
the banking system, a more adequate solution, the author contends, is to 
enact standing legislation to take effect during bank runs and financial 
crises that differentiates insolvent from solvent banks, and saves the 
latter from being eventually driven into bankruptcy.  Just as bankruptcy 
legislation seeks to avoid an inefficient race for the debtors’ assets, the 
central function of a bank restructuring mechanism should be to avoid 
panicky cash withdrawals and the fire selling of bank assets, with the 
associated loss in value.  Coupled together, bankruptcy law and a bank 
restructuring mechanism allow the temporary suspension of property 
rights as the only possible means of maximizing the observance of 
property rights.  In order to maximize the net worth of the depositors’ 
rights, the bank restructuring mechanism would allow the suspension 
and reorganization of remedies.  Functionally, this mechanism could be 
regarded as a bankruptcy-like process.  Therefore, the Constitution 
allows Congress to pass legislation for restructuring bank debts, 
especially in the context of bank runs and illiquidity crises.  Because this 
type of legislation is a variety of bankruptcy legislation, its constitution-
ality could be sustained without recourse to the emergency or monetary 
paradigms.  Even if Congress failed to establish a standing bank re-
structuring piece of legislation, it should be understood that Congress 
retains its power to do so once a crisis has started.  Naturally, Congres-
 208. Peter Morriss, How Capitalism Infringes Property Rights, 31 POL. STUD. 656 
(1983); see also Chandran Kukathas, Does Capitalism Infringe Property Rights? A 
Reply to Peter Morriss, 32 POL. STUD. 611 (1984). 
 209. NOZICK, supra note 52, at 75. 
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sional powers do not diminish in the face of a crisis.  A bank run is a 
market failure, due in part to a lack of coordination, which diminishes 
the net worth of banks’ assets.210  Congressional power to pass bank-
ruptcy legislation covers all forms of state-regulated mechanisms for 
collecting creditor rights when consensual renegotiations are subject to 
high transaction costs.  An emergency declar
isite for Congress to exercise this power. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to espouse the bankruptcy 
paradigm in detail.  Nevertheless, it will be helpful to explain how this 
paradigm might be brought to bear in practice.  One possible conception 
of this paradigm consists of three complementary strategies, all of which 
are designed to solve banking illiquidity and insolvency in countries that 
have a hard peg, formal dollarization, or extended de facto dollarization.  
In all cases, the Central Bank cannot act as a lender of last resort and 
therefore, a dollar liquidity run has a great propensity to become a bank 
run.  The background monetary policy of these strategies is to preserve 
financial dollarization of stock and to adopt the margin conversion of 
contracts into the national currency (pesos).  This means that the Gov-
ernment consolidates all pesos in circulation (as well as quasi-monies) 
into a new national currency: the “nonconvertible peso.”  In this way, 
the function of the U.S. dollar as preserver of value is maintained be-
cause existing financial contracts are not “pesified”; at the same time, 
the nonconvertible peso is established as a unit of denomination and a 
means of payment of new financial contracts and all non-financial 
contracts.  This consolidation of the national currency solves the prob-
lems of the nominal flexibility of public spending and the sticky nature 
of salaries in the unionized sectors because depreciation of the floating 
national currency automatically deflates public and pr
h are denominated in the nonconvertible currency.211 
The first “nonconvertible peso” strategy (“Strategy I”) corrects 
balance-sheet mismatches arising from maintenance of dollarization of 
the national currency.  The goal of Strategy I is achieved by establishing 
 210. See Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 3, 401-19 (1983). 
 211. Augusto De la Torre et al., Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and 
Fall of Argentina’s Currency Board (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 
2980, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=352380. 
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Levy Yeyati212, is to automatically suspend the convertibility of deposits 
into currency (“internal convertibility”) when the liquidity of banks falls 
below a certain threshold as a result of a systemic crisis.  In this 
proposal, the suspension of convertibility clause is ex ante included in 
financial contracts, so that suspension of convertibility in the given 
conditions does not constitute a breach of contract. 
Thus, in the author’s view, the “negative pole” of the “circuit 
breaker” is to shorten the average length of loans in the tradables and 
other high-profit sectors.  Just as many bank credits are awarded on a 
variable interest rate, all credits given to large domestic or multinational 
corporations should include a variable maturity period.  It is conceded 
that this form of pre-cancellation of credits may only be applicable in a 
limited scale, basically to large corporations that obtain liquidity through 
exports.  The usefulness of this mechanism, however, cannot be sum-
marily discarded.  For instance, when systemic illiquidity exceeds a cer-
tain limit, the regulator authorizes banks to call in their loans to oil cor-
porations by anticipating the maturity of those loans.  Even when this 
double pole circuit breaker is not explicitly provided for ex ante in finan-
cial contracts, the bankruptcy paradigm constitutionally allows its im-
position by ex post facto legislation.  This is because all contracts are 
subject to an “implicit bankruptcy clause”; if repayments become impos-
sible, the government is empowered to establish procedures that maxi-
mize the expected repayment for all creditors by maximizing the net 
worth of the debtors’ assets. 
The second strategy (“Strategy II”) allows banks confronted with a 
systemic crisis to issue freely negotiable notes in order to repay time 
deposits.  These notes would not be redeemable in paper currency on 
demand, but rather after a variable period of months with an annual 
interest payable at the end of this period.  These bank notes would have 
the same qualities attributed to bank notes in regimes of private money: 
 212. Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Liquidity Insurance in a Financially Dollarized 
Economy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12345, 2006), available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12345. 
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[T]he name or denomination a bank chooses for its issue will be 
protected like a brand name or trade mark against unauthorized use, 
and . . .  there will be the same protection against forgery as against 
that of any other document.  These banks will then be vying for the 
use of their issue by the public by making them as convenient to use 
as possible.213 
“Private money” regimes are not a theoretical fiction.  In fact, the 
experience of free banking was documented in Scotland during the 
period of 1695-1845.214  In 1704, facing a bank run,  the Bank of 
Scotland suspended payments for four months and announced that it 
would pay five percent annual interest for the period of the delay.  Some 
years later, this option was inserted onto the currency.215 
In a banking crisis, solvent banks could issue notes that could work 
as well as the Bank of Scotland’s notes in 1730.  In fact, Argentina had 
an experience with bank notes in 2002, when the Government awarded 
certificates of rescheduled deposits (CEDROs) to depositors who did not 
opt for the swap of deposits for bonds.216  CEDROs were publicly traded 
and negotiable through the secondary market.217  Unlike CEDROs, bank 
notes under Strategy II would be denominated in the same currency as 
original deposits, and their circulation would be unrestricted.  One virtue 
of this scheme is that it would discriminate between solvent and 
insolvent banks instead of lumping them together under the umbrella of 
the systemic crisis.  This would mitigate moral hazard problems. 
These first two strategies address the problem of systemic illi-
quidity.  The third strategy (“Strategy III”) provides a procedural reso-
lution for banks that become insolvent.  This procedure assumes that 
banks have a corporate structure that includes a bank holding company 
and two distinct subsidiaries: a payments bank and a financial 
subsidiary.  The liabilities of the payments bank consist of demand 
accounts and small deposits, which are typically insured; the bank’s 
assets are only prime-quality.  The financial subsidiary handles all 
remaining operations and is subject to regulatory requirements similar to 
those of commercial banks.  The procedure works as follows:  when 
 213. F. A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES 38 (1976). 
 214. LAWRENCE H. WHITE, FREE BANKING IN BRITAIN, THEORY, EXPERIENCE, AND 
DEBATE, 1800-1845 (1984). 
 215. Id. at 26. 
 216. Gómez-Giglio, supra note 46. 
 217. Id. at 403. 
816 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
illiquidity is so serious that the bank’s solvency is threatened, the 
regulator proceeds (by his own decision or at the bank’s request) to 
freeze all the operations of the financial subsidiary (i.e., a sort of 
permanent “circuit-breaker”).  Equity is written off to zero and the re-
maining liabilities and assets are set to constitute a mutual fund, where 
deposits are exchanged into senior shares and other liabilities are trans-
formed into junior shares.  The payments bank continues its operations 
in nonconvertible currency until liquidation.218 
IX.  THE EMERGENCY PARADIGM AND THE  
BANKRUPTCY PARADIGM COMPARED 
Figure 1 summarizes the doctrinal features of the paradigms for 
property reshaping.  Both the emergency and the bankruptcy paradigms 
allow putting off the maturity of contracts, or the remedies for their 
breach.  This feature allows them to confront panicky withdrawals 
during a bank run when the affected banks are solvent.  By contrast, the 
monetary and the valorist paradigms lack this feature, which is crucial 
for dealing with bank runs.  In endorsing vast redistributive powers, the 
social justice paradigm can modify both time and nominal quantity of 
deposits, but it can seriously alter the structure of incentives on which 
any robust financial system relies. 
 
Figure 1:  Features of Property Reshaping Paradigms 
Denomination          Variations 
Paradigms 
Time Quantity 
(Nominal) Internal External 
Emergency Yes No No No 
Monetary No No Yes No 
Valorist No Yes No No 
Social Justice Yes Yes No No 
Bankruptcy Yes Yes* No No 
* In cases of insolvency. 
 
 
Given the doctrinal features, the emergency and the bankruptcy 
paradigms are the most effective in coping with a financial debacle, 
 
 218. Pablo E. Guidotti, Toward a Liquidity Risk Management Strategy for Emerging 
Market Economies, in LATIN AMERICAN MACROECONOMIC REFORM, THE SECOND 
STAGE § 8.2.3 (José Antonio González et al. eds., 2003). 
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particularly when the banking system is healthy.  While both paradigms 
have similar doctrinal features, they critically differ in their institutional 
implications. 
Primarily, the bankruptcy paradigm has three fundamental ad-
vantages.  The first advantage is a corollary of Mancur Olson’s famous 
theory of groups.219  The core postulate of this theory is that “the larger 
the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of 
a collective good,” where the collective good can be distributional gains 
at the expense of the welfare of society.220  The explanation of this 
postulate is that “an individual member . . . gets only part of the benefit 
of any expenditure he makes to obtain more of the collective good,” 
which means that “he will discontinue his purchase of the collective 
good before the optimal amount for the group as a whole has been 
obtained.”221  Olson draws nine second-level implications from his 
theory, namely, propositions that follow from the theory together with 
basic facts and microeconomic assumptions.222  Among these implica-
tions, which serve to explain political phenomena in a democratic polity, 
the third implication is relevant to explain the rent seeking function of 
much of the legislation passed within the emergency paradigm:  
“members of small groups have disproportionate organizational power 
for collective action, and this disproportion diminishes but does not 
disappear over time in stable society.”223  Therefore, “oligopolies and 
other small groups have a greater likelihood of being able to organize for 
collective action, and can usually organize with less delay, than large 
groups.”224  Though Olson himself failed to place great emphasis on 
organizational speed, the author contends that this factor is critical for 
understanding the particular shape that emergency measures often take 
in financial debacles.225 
 219. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 33-36 (1971). 
 220. Id. at 35. 
 221. Id. at 35. 
 222. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 74 (1982). 
 223. Id. at 41. 
 224. Id. (emphasis added). 
 225. One clarification is in order.  Olson concedes that “encompassing” labor 
organizations (i.e., organizations that represent a large percentage of the work force) 
can self-regulate their demands, and Lange and Garrett have shown that this variable is 
positively associated with rent-seeking reduction and economic growth only if 
accompanied by political control of government.  See Peter Lange & Geoffrey Garrett, 
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The idea of an emergency suggests that action must not be delayed, 
and therefore that much deliberation and discussion is self-defeating.  
Thus, because of time constraints, emergency powers are typically 
exerted with greater discretion and less accountability than normal 
powers.  Typically, when a state of emergency is declared, a sort of rent-
seeking festival simultaneously opens to small redistributive coalitions.  
Small interest groups who tend to have a successful rent-seeking 
apparatus already in operation act quickly to obtain wealth redis-
tributions in their favor.  Because large unorganized groups work at a 
much lower speed (if at all), small highly organized groups have the 
greatest chance to get the greatest redistributive stakes.  Faster decision-
making speed, implicated by a state of emergency, only exacerbates the 
organizational constraints of large groups, who for this reason are more 
exposed to “exploitation” by small groups.  This process reverses the 
natural result of democratic decision-making.  Furthermore, it violates 
the second condition in Larreta’s four-condition test,226 because rent-
seeking, by definition, does not promote the general welfare of the 
people.227 
Emergency legislation in the United States highlights interesting 
examples.  There are helpful rent-seeking analyses of the labor 
legislation backed in Lochner228 and of the regulatory legislation en-
dorsed in Carolene Products.229  Rent-seeking interpretation of 
The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the 
Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980, 47 J. POL. 792, 792-827 (1985).  
However, emergency situations offer such short-term opportunities for massive rent-
seeking that self-regulation cannot be rationally expected, even if the relevant groups 
are encompassing, which in addition is not generally the case.  For the list of the one 
hundred most indebted corporations in Argentina on December 31, 2001, see 
ALEJANDRO RODRÍGUEZ DIEZ, DEVALUACIÓN Y PESIFICACIÓN 230-33 (2003). 
 226. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 7/12/1934, “Avico v. de la 
Pesa,” Fallos (1934-172-21) (Arg.). 
 227. EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 138 (rent-seeking is “[t]he activity of 
individuals who spend resources in the pursuit of monopoly rights granted by gov-
ernment; the process of spending resources in an effort to obtain an economic 
transfer”); see also Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent- Seeking 
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 291-303 (1974). 
 228. David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 85 
WASH. L. REV 5, 1469-1528 (2005). 
 229. Geoffrey Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, SUP. CT. REV. 397 
(1987). 
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Argentine emergency legislation in the same period is also available.230  
Emergency legislation in financial crises is amenable to a similar 
analysis.  For instance, the Great Depression was a great occasion for 
rent-seeking.  It is well known that with the abandonment of the gold 
standard, President Roosevelt sought to raise the price of farm products, 
which had been affected by the preceding period of deflation.  
According to author Murray Rothbard, the reflationist program was agi-
tated by agricultural and industrial lobbyists gathered in the Committee 
for the Nation to Rebuild Prices and Purchasing Power.  Rothbard 
explains: 
The Committee for the Nation at first included several hundred 
industrial and agricultural leaders, and within a year its membership 
reached over two thousand.  Its recommendations, beginning with 
going off gold and embargoing gold exports, and continuing through 
devaluing the dollar and raising the price of gold, were fairly closely 
followed by the Roosevelt administration.231 
In recent financial crises in emerging economies, various redis-
tributive transfers have been empirically studied: transfers to the finan-
cial sector; transfers to large and foreign depositors; transfers to large, 
bank-related borrowers; and benefits for high-income households.232  In 
the Argentine crisis, in particular, it is well documented now that trans-
fers to large, bank-related borrowers were dominant in the “asymmetric 
pesification” implemented by Decree 214/2002.233  It is likewise well 
 230. Horacio Spector & Sergio Berensztein, Business, Government, and Law, in A 
NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ARGENTINA 339-48 (Gerardo della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor 
eds., 2004). 
 231. Murray N. Rothbard, The New Deal and the International Monetary System, in 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND NEW DEAL MONETARY POLICY 94 (Garet Garrett & 
Murray N. Rothbard eds., 1980). 
 232. Marina Halac & Sergio L. Schmukler, Distributional Effects of Crises: The 
Role of Financial Transfers, (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3173, 
2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer 
/IW3P/IB/2004/01/20/000160016_20040120172705/Rendered/PDF/wps3173.pdf. 
 233. The currency board itself was probably a rent seeking institution.  In fact, it 
may be argued that Convertibility Plan institutions (central bank independence, privati-
zation of public utilities under a monopoly regime, etc.) were established to allow 
Government and its business allies to maximize rent seeking in the 1990s.  Many 
Argentines make a similar point by saying that convertibility was an “exchange rate 
insurance.”  See Sebastián Etchemendy, Constructing Reform Coalitions: The Politics 
of Compensations in Argentina’s Economic Liberalization, 43 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 
1, 1-35 (2002) (an illuminating discussion of the political economy of Argentina’s 
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known in Argentina that the former president of the powerful Argentine 
Industrial Union (UIA), José Ignacio de Mendiguren, who was 
appointed Minister of Production in early 2002, was a strong supporter 
of asymmetric pesification.234  In fact, lobbyists’ actions in favor of the 
measure were revealed by Jorge Remes Lenicov, advisor and Minister of 
Economy to President Duhalde, in an e-mail addressed to journalist 
Joaquín Morales Solá and many other figures.235  Remes Lenicov af-
firmed that the decision was taken as a result of pressures from Indus-
trialists and bankers.236  After this e-mail was widely diffused in the 
media, banker Carlos Heller, from Asociación de Bancos Públicos y 
Privados de la República Argentina (ABAPPRA.), confirmed UIA’s 
intervention.  Heller denied, however, that the bankers supported pesifi-
cation.237  Speaking about a key meeting at the Palacio de Hacienda 
(Palace of the Treasury), Heller said:  “This is not true.  I was in that 
meeting and argued with Jorge Todesca, second in hierarchy to Remes 
Lenicov, and the people from UIA, who encouraged the decision to 
pesify.”  He added: 
I publicly promoted the proposal of creating a trust with what could 
be cashed from the main 1,200 major debtors of the system, who 
concentrated 50% of credits.  These loans should not have been 
pesified and so creditors could have been guaranteed restitution in 
the original currency up to the amount cashed.  But they told me that 
this was not possible and that debts would be pesified.  There was a 
political decision to liquefy debts.238 
In contrast, bankruptcy-like legislation should ideally be discussed 
and decided before the crisis hits and when there is uncertainty about 
how different details in the proposal will benefit or harm various interest 
“liberalization” reforms in the 1990s); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of 
Central Bank Independence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1998). 
 234. Mendiguren resigned in April 2002 and is now one of UIA’s Vice Presidents. 
 235. Julio Nudler, Cuando Remes desembucha, PAGINA/12, Aug. 17, 2002, 
available at http://www.pagina12.com.ar/imprimir/diario/economia/2-9007-2002-08-
17.html. 
 236. Id. 
 237. However, some commentators persuasively note that banks agreed to 
asymmetric pesification because they were assured sufficient compensation through 
Government’s bonds.  See, e.g., Rodríguez Diez, supra note 225, at 111. 
 238. Remes Lenicov declaró que cuando propuso pesificar los bancos dijeron que sí, 
LA NACIÓN, Aug. 18, 2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota 
_id=423350. 
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groups.  This uncertainty reduces the expected value of all rent seeking 
investments, even those made by highly concentrated groups. 
Second, emergency measures treat all banks and financial entities 
alike, irrespective of their liabilities and assets.  This causes a serious 
moral hazard problem in the banking system.  On the one hand, depos-
itors anticipating that emergency measures will give them equal odds of 
recovery in the face of a crisis will not rationally invest resources in 
obtaining information regarding an entity’s financial solidity.  On the 
other hand (and related to consumers’ behavior), banks will not ration-
ally invest in maintaining liquid assets.  The latter effect is dramatic in 
exchange regimes that lack a lender of last resort (hard pegs and formal 
dollarization).  If the banking system is subject to periodic emergencies, 
there is little chance to develop a sizable local market of capital sources, 
which means that social welfare and GDP growth will be lower than 
they could be otherwise. 
Finally, emergency powers represent an anomaly within the liberal 
system of political power.  It is true that emergency powers have been 
often recognized in both the United States and Argentina in great nation-
al emergencies.239  In the last few decades, however, various Argentine 
governments have abused emergency powers whose justification rests 
on emergencies that usually have strong fiscal components and that 
therefore, are under government control.240  More fundamentally, 
Negretto and Aguilar Rivera claim that “liberalism – the political theory 
that informed Spanish American constitution makers – traditionally 
lacked an adequate theoretical framework to address the problem of 
emergencies in political life.”241  Typically, “regulatory emergencies” 
lead to “functional emergencies”; these, in turn, lead to a permanent 
alteration of the separation of powers. Because emergencies tend to alter 
the separation of powers by delegating congressional powers in the 
executive branch, the real upshot of the theory of emergency is to in-
crease the President’s power at the expense of the legislative and judicial 
branches.  A good example is Peralta, which recognized the President’s 
power to enact legislative orders under a state of emergency.242  Three 
 239. Banks & Carrió, supra note 58. 
 240. Mairal, supra note 10. 
 241. Gabriel L. Negretto & José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency 
Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional 
Dictatorship, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.  1797-98 (2000). 
 242. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], 27/12/1990, “Peralta, Luis 
Arcenio v. Nación Argentina / acción de amparo,” Fallos (1990-313-513) (Arg.). 
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years later, the Constitutional Reform of 1994 introduced decrees of 
necessity and urgency, thus permanently altering the system of checks 
and balances originally established in the Argentine constitution. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The restructuring of financial property after macro-economic 
debacles has often proceeded in accordance with four different para-
digms: the emergency paradigm, the monetary paradigm, the valorist 
paradigm, and the social justice paradigm.  The emergency paradigm has 
been the prevailing paradigm to resolve legal controversies arising from 
bank runs and economic crises.  The monetary paradigm has tradition-
ally been used to ground legal tender legislation, which establishes the 
inconvertibility of the national currency and economic liquefaction of 
public debts denominated in the national currency.  The valorist para-
digm has also been used for redistributing gains and burdens in macro-
economic debacles (i.e., hyperinflations).  All these paradigms show 
important doctrinal differences.  The emergency paradigm can serve to 
modify the time dimension of obligations (i.e., maturity), but not their 
nature (i.e., their currency denomination, or nominal quantity).  The 
valorist paradigm can serve to modify the nominal amount of obliga-
tions, but not their time dimension.  The monetary paradigm can ground 
a modification of the currency denomination of contracts (and the value 
thereof) when contracts are denominated in the national currency 
(internal denomination), but not when contracts are denominated in a 
foreign currency (external denomination).  Therefore, this paradigm 
cannot be applied to countries that have formal or de facto dollari-
zation.243  The social justice paradigm is unnecessarily costly in terms of 
prosperity and welfare, because it can destroy the incentive structure of 
the banking system; egalitarian wealth redistribution can be less costly 
achieved through taxation and the recognition of a basic income 
entitlement. 
Finally, the bankruptcy paradigm suggested in this Article can 
include a variety of restructuring measures.  Three examples have been 
mentioned in this paper:  a “double pole circuit breaker,” a scheme of 
freely negotiable bank notes issued by solvent entities, and the creation 
 243. This was the case of Argentina in 2001.  However, this paradigm could be 
applied in countries that require financial contracts to be denominated in the national 
currency (e.g., Brazil). 
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of a mutual fund encompassing the assets and liabilities of insolvent 
banks.244  None of these strategies require utilizing the emergency, the 
monetary, the valorist, or the social justice paradigms.  Moreover, there 
are political economic reasons that favor the bankruptcy paradigm as 
compared with the emergency paradigm.  Political and economic factors 
predict that the emergency paradigm will systematically be wielded to 
legitimize exploitation of large, unorganized groups.  The emergency 
paradigm also creates constitutional threats for the separation of powers, 
as well as moral hazard problems in bank operations. 
 
 244. Peralta, Luis Arcenio, Fallos (1990-313-513); see supra Part IX. 
